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Insanity Acquittee Not Entitled to Blanket Sealing of Record of a Recommitment Proceeding But Is Entitled to Sealing of His Clinical Record

The Third Department determined respondent, who is subject to Criminal Procedure Law 330.20 based on his acquittal of criminal charges by reason of mental disease or defect, was not entitled to a blanket sealing of the record of a recommitment proceeding pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law 9.31 (F), but was entitled to the sealing of his clinical record pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law 33.13:

Here, respondent was subject to CPL 330.20 based upon his acquittal of criminal charges by reason of mental disease or defect. A lack of responsibility for criminal conduct by reason of mental disease or defect is an affirmative defense that a defendant must raise and prove by a preponderance of the evidence (see Penal Law §§ 25.00 [2]; 40.15). By avoiding criminal penalties and becoming subject to CPL 330.20, “this places insanity acquittees in a significantly different posture than involuntarily committed civil patients” …, and “rational differences between procedures for commitment and release applicable to defendants found not responsible and persons involuntarily committed under the Mental Hygiene Law are justifiable” … . In light of this distinction, we agree with Supreme Court that the blanket sealing of the record that is specifically applicable to the involuntarily admission of civil patients under Mental Hygiene Law § 9.31 (f) is not applicable to respondent … .

We reach a different conclusion, however, regarding defendant’s clinical record. Pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law § 33.13, a clinical record for each patient or client shall be kept containing “information on all matters relating to the admission, legal status, care, and treatment of the patient or client and shall include all pertinent documents relating to the patient or client” (Mental Hygiene Law § 33.13 [a]) and “such information about patients or clients . . . shall not be a public record,” subject to certain exceptions (Mental Hygiene Law § 33.13 [c]). Although Supreme Court ruled that respondent’s clinical treatment records, related hospital records and unrelated medical records must be sealed, it is unclear if other information intended to be included in his clinical record under Mental Hygiene Law § 33.13 (a) would be made public. In our view, respondent is entitled to the full protection of Mental Hygiene Law § 33.13, and all information contained in his clinical record, as defined in Mental Hygiene Law § 33.13 (a), shall not be made public, subject to the statutory exceptions (see Mental Hygiene Law § 33.13 [c]). Matter of John Z. (John Z.), 2015 NY Slip Op 04361, 3rd Dept 5-21-15

 

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