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In Order for a Municipality to Be Liable for the Creation of a Dangerous Condition, the Dangerous Condition Must Result Immediately from the Negligent Act—Here the Allegation the Dangerous Condition Developed Over a Period of Years Was Not Sufficient

The Second Department noted that the “prior written notice” requirement (as a prerequisite for municipal liability for a dangerous condition) is independent of any actual or constructive notice of a defect.  Although there is an exception to the “prior written notice” requirement where the municipality created the defect through an affirmative act of negligence, that act of negligence must immediately result in the existence of a dangerous condition. It is not sufficient to allege that the defect developed over a period of years (here allegedly stemming from work done in 2008):

“A municipality that has adopted a prior written notice law’ cannot be held liable for a defect within the scope of the law absent the requisite written notice” … . A defendant’s actual or constructive notice of the allegedly defective condition does not satisfy the prior written notice requirement … . Further, although an exception to the prior written notice requirement exists where the municipality created the defect through an affirmative act of negligence …, that exception “[is] limited to work by the [municipality] that immediately results in the existence of a dangerous condition”… . DeVita v Town of Brookhaven, 2015 NY Slip Op 04086, 2nd Dept 5-13-15

 

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