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There Must Be a Determination of Paternity Before Making an Abandonment Finding

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Dillon, determined Family Court should have granted appellant’s request for DNA testing before finding that appellant had abandoned the child (thereby freeing the child for adoption).  Appellant did not know whether he was the father of the child and there was no evidence of his paternity.  Appellant feared the abandonment finding would negatively affect his relationship with his four children. The Second Department held the abandonment finding could not be made unless appellant is the father, so whether appellant is the father must be determined first:

We are asked to address whether a Family Court may render a determination that a putative father has abandoned a child so as to free the child for adoption, if there is not first a threshold finding that the putative father is, in fact, the father of the child. For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that where paternity is not ascertained in fact or by law, the Family Court may not conclusorily find that a respondent is not a “consent father,” or that his consent, while otherwise required, has been forfeited by reason of his abandonment of the child. Matter of Heaven A. A. (Tyrone W.–Stephanie A.), 2015 NY Slip Op 03833, 2nd Dept 5-6-15

 

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