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Doctor Who Allegedly Wrongfully Prescribed Narcotics for a Drug Addict Who Shot Plaintiff’s Decedent in an Attempt to Steal Narcotics from a Pharmacy Did Not Owe a Duty of Care to Plaintiff’s Decedent

The Second Department determined the duty to protect persons from the criminal acts of others did not extend to plaintiff’s decedent.  Plaintiff sued a doctor who operated a pain management clinic, alleging that the doctor operated a “pill mill” and wrongfully provided drugs to a drug addict,  The drug addict shot plaintiff’s decedent during a robbery of a drug store in an attempt to steal narcotics. The court noted that there are situations in which a defendant exercises sufficient control to prevent harm to others. Here, however, in the absence of such control, the doctor owed no duty of care to plaintiff’s decedent:

“The question of whether a defendant owes a duty of care to another person is a question of law for the courts” … .

Generally, “[w]ithout a duty running directly to the injured person there can be no liability in damages, however careless the conduct or foreseeable the harm” … . Further, “there is no duty to control the conduct of third persons to prevent them from causing injury to others,’ even where, as a practical matter, the defendant could have exercised such control” … .

… Courts have imposed a duty of care “where there exist special circumstances in which there is sufficient authority and ability to control the conduct of third persons” that courts have identified a duty to exercise such control … . Thus, courts have imposed a duty to control the conduct of others “where there is a special relationship: a relationship between [the] defendant and [the] third person whose actions expose [the] plaintiff to harm such as would require [the] defendant to protect the plaintiff from the conduct of others” … .

The Supreme Court erred in denying [the doctor’s] motion to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against him for failure to state a cause of action. [The doctor] did not owe a duty to the decedent or to the general public because no special circumstances existed. The decedent was a stranger to [the shooter] and a member of the general public, not a member of “a determinate and identified class” … . Malone v County of Suffolk, 2015 NY Slip Op 03811, 2nd Dept 5-6-15

 

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