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Statutory Three-Year Moratorium on Seeking a Lower Tax Assessment Applies to New Owner of the Property

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Dillon, determined that the three-year moratorium on tax certiorari proceedings following a reduced assessment applied to a subsequent purchaser of the land. The seller of the land successfully won a reduced assessment of the land due to chemical contamination.  The purchaser of the land then sought a further reduction, based upon a much lower appraisal of the value of the land, within the three-year statutory moratorium period:

Central to this appeal is the language, purpose, and legislative intent of RPTL 727(1), which states, in relevant part, that

“where an assessment being reviewed pursuant to this article is found to be unlawful, unequal, excessive or misclassified by final court order or judgment, the assessed valuation so determined shall not be changed for such property for the next three succeeding assessment rolls prepared on the basis of the three taxable status dates next occurring on or after the taxable status date of the most recent assessment under review in the proceeding subject to such final order or judgment” (RPTL 727[1]). * * *

What distinguishes these matters from many tax certiorari proceedings is the change in the property’s ownership … . RPTL 727(2) sets forth certain circumstances under which property assessments may be challenged despite the three-year moratorium, mainly involving revaluations of all properties on a municipal entity’s assessment rolls, physical changes to the property, zoning changes, and other recognized exceptions not relevant here (see RPTL 727[2][a-I]…). These recognized exceptions address situations where changes in circumstances defeat the statute’s purpose of locking in judicially settled assessments to maintain the status quo, because the changed circumstances themselves upset the status quo … .

A change in a property’s ownership is not listed in the statute as an exception to the three-year moratorium of RPTL 727(1). Under the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the presence of exceptions in RPTL 727(2), without inclusion of a property sale exception among them, must be inferentially construed as the Legislature’s intent not to except from the three-year moratorium circumstances where property is sold to a new owner… . Matter of ELT Harriman, LLC v Assessor of Town of Woodbury, 2015 NY Slip Op 03356, 2nd Dept 4-22-15

 

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