You are here: / / Lessee Who Has Authority to Control the Work Is Liable Under the Labor...
,

Lessee Who Has Authority to Control the Work Is Liable Under the Labor Law

The Second Department reversed Supreme Court finding that plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment on his Labor Law 240 (1) claim. Plaintiff alleged that a ladder twisted out from under him when he was carrying materials to the roof and defendant (Sigma) did not raise a question of fact whether plaintiff’s conduct was the sole proximate cause of his injuries. The court explained the circumstances under which a tenant, the defendant (Sigma) here, is liable under the Labor Law:

Labor Law § 240(1) applies to owners, contractors, and their agents (see Labor Law § 240[1]…). A party is deemed to be an agent of an owner or contractor under the Labor Law when it has the ” ability to control the activity which brought about the injury'” … . A lessee of real property that hires a contractor and has the right to control the work at the property is considered to be an owner within the meaning of the law … . Moreover, a lessee of property may be liable as an “owner” when it “has the right or authority to control the work site, even if the lessee did not hire the general contractor” … . The key question is whether the defendant had the right to insist that proper safety practices were followed … . Here, the evidence established that Sigma was the lessee of the premises where the accident occurred and that the president of Sigma hired the injured plaintiff to perform the work and controlled his work. Seferovic v Atlantic Real Estate Holdings, LLC, 2015 NY Slip Op 03343, 2nd Dept 4-22-15

 

You might also like
THE INSURED, WHO WAS SEEKING UNINSURED MOTORIST BENEFITS, DID NOT TIMELY NOTIFY HER INSURER OF THE TRAFFIC ACCIDENT; THEREFORE THE INSURER’S PETITION TO PERMANENTLY STAY ARBITRATION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
PRESUMABLY THE ROBBERY AND GRAND LARCENY CHARGES STEMMED FROM THE THEFT OF THE TAXI CAB (THE FACTS ARE NOT EXPLAINED); THE ACQUITTAL OF UNAUTHORIZED USE OF A MOTOR VEHICLE RENDERED THE ROBBERY AND GRAND LARCENY CONVICTIONS REPUGNANT (SECOND DEPT).
PETITION TO STAY ARBITRATION IN THIS UNDERINSURED MOTORIST PROCEEDING WAS SERVED AFTER THE 20-DAY STATUTORY PERIOD FOR SERVICE AND WAS NOT SERVED IN THE MANNER REQUIRED BY THE STATUTE (CPLR 7503(c)); THEREFORE THE APPLICATION TO STAY ARBITRATION WAS JURISDICTIONALLY DEFECTIVE (SECOND DEPT).
DEFAMATORY STATEMENTS RELATING TO ISSUES OF BROAD PUBLIC INTEREST POSTED ON FACEBOOK MAY BE ENCOMPASSED BY THE ANTI-SLAPP STATUTE; HERE, HOWEVER, THE STATEMENTS (ALLEGATIONS OF SEXUAL ABUSE) RELATED TO A PURELY PRIVATE MATTER AND, THEREFORE, WERE NOT ENCOMPASSED BY THE STATUTE (SECOND DEPT).
Question of Fact Whether Deed Procured by Fraud and Whether Mortgagee Had Notice of the Potential Fraud
Questions of Fact Raised About Whether Student Assumed the Risk of Injury from Indoor Soccer Practice–Relevant Law Discussed In Some Depth
PLAINTIFF WAS A NONMEMBER PURCHASER OF A MEMBER’S INTEREST IN THE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY (LLC) AND THEREFORE COULD NOT BRING DERIVATIVE CAUSES OF ACTION ON BEHALF OF THE LLC (SECOND DEPT).
ALTHOUGH SUPREME COURT PROPERLY PRECLUDED DEFENDANT FROM PRESENTING EVIDENCE AT TRIAL BECAUSE OF DISCOVERY ORDER VIOLATIONS, SUPREME COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY STRIKING DEFENDANT’S ANSWER (SECOND DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2025 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

Strictly Construing the Policy, Falling Through a Defective Manhole (Located... Failure to Give the “Missing Witness” Jury Instruction Required...