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Failure to Provide Statutory Notice of a Motion to Enter a Default Judgment to a Defendant Who Has Appeared in the Case Is a Jurisdictional Defect Rendering the Default Judgment a Nullity

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Cohen, determined the failure to give a defendant, who has appeared in an action, notice of a motion to enter a default judgment is a defect which deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction (rendering the default judgment a nullity pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (4)).  The issue is one of first impression in the Second Department and the Second Department declined to follow a contrary ruling in the 3rd Department. When the defendant previously appeared in the case, the defendant failed to demonstrate a reasonable excuse for failure to answer the complaint. Therefore, although the plaintiff’s failure to provide the notice required by CPLR 3215 (g) (1) mandated vacatur of the default judgment, it did not, under the facts, relieve the appellant of the underlying default. Upon notice of a future motion to enter a default judgment, the defendant here may contest only the sufficiency of the factual allegations in the motion and the amount of damages:

The question of whether vacatur of the default judgment pursuant to CPLR 5015(a)(4) is appropriate where the moving party fails to notify the defendant of its motion for leave to enter a default judgment as provided by CPLR 3215(g)(1) is one of first impression in this Court. Under CPLR 5015(a)(4), a rendering court may relieve a moving party of such an order if it lacked the jurisdiction to render it in the first place. Here, it is uncontested that the Supreme Court had personal jurisdiction over the appellant, as well as jurisdiction over the subject matter in this case. However, for the reasons set forth below, we hold that the failure of the plaintiffs to give notice to the appellant of their motion for leave to enter a default judgment pursuant to CPLR 3215(g)(1) deprived the Supreme Court of jurisdiction to entertain the motion, and the court should have vacated the default judgment pursuant to CPLR 5015(a)(4). * * *

…[W]e hold that the failure to provide a defendant who has appeared in an action with the notice required by CPLR 3215(g)(1), like the failure to provide proper notice of other kinds of motions, is a jurisdictional defect that deprives the court of the authority to entertain a motion for leave to enter a default judgment. While this defect requires vacatur of the judgment, it does not, standing alone, entitle the appellant to be relieved of the underlying default upon which judgment is sought, and to defend the action on the merits … . Since the appellant has failed to establish a basis to be relieved from his underlying default in failing to answer, that underlying default remains intact. Accordingly, the appellant is entitled only to statutory notice of any future motion for leave to enter a default judgment. Upon such a future motion, the appellant may not seek to relitigate the issue of whether he is entitled to be relieved of his underlying default in failing to answer. Rather, as relevant to this case, the appellant may oppose entry of a default judgment to the limited extent of contesting the sufficiency of the proof of facts submitted by the plaintiffs in support of the motion, and contesting damages.  Paulus v Christopher Vacirca, Inc., 2015 NY Slip Op 02944, 2nd Dept 4-8-15

 

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