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Frye Hearing Should Have Been Held to Determine Admissibility of an Actuarial Recidivism Risk Assessment Tool as Proof of a Mental Abnormality

The Second Department determined defendant was entitled to a new trial because the trial court refused defendant’s request for a Frye hearing.  The People introduced the Hare PCL-R Instrument (an actuarial recidivism risk assessment tool), which measures psychopathy, during the mental abnormality phase of the trial. The use of the PCL-R to prove a mental abnormality was deemed “novel” by the Second Department.  Therefore, a Frye hearing should have been held to determine its admissibility for the “novel” purpose:

…[T]he Supreme Court erred in denying that branch of the appellant’s pretrial motion which was to conduct a hearing pursuant to Frye v United States (293 F 1013) concerning the admissibility of the Hare PCL-R Instrument (hereinafter the PCL-R), which measures psychopathy, during the mental abnormality phase of the trial … . While the use of actuarial risk assessment instruments is scientifically accepted as a means to measure the risk of recidivism, the use of such instruments to determine the existence of a mental abnormality is novel, and the State’s bare statement to the contrary was insufficient to satisfy the “general acceptance” test of admissibility … . For these same reasons, the court erred in concluding that the probative value of the PCL-R outweighed any prejudicial effect of the terms “psychopath” or “psychopathy.” Significantly, the State’s expert … testified that the PCL-R is not a “direct assessment of mental abnormality” and was “not designed” to measure “[h]ow much more difficult [it is] for somebody who has a high psychopathy score to control their behavior [as compared to] somebody who has a low score” and that “would be [a] misuse of the test.” Under the particular circumstances of this case, it cannot be said that this error was harmless, since there is a reasonable possibility that the jury could have reached another verdict had it not heard such testimony … . Matter of State of New York v Ian I., 2015 NY Slip Op 02771, 2nd Dept 4-1-15

 

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