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Stipulation to a Reduced Tax Assessment Freezes the Assessment at the Reduced Level for Three Years by Operation of Statute

Choosing not to follow the 3rd Department, the Fourth Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Centra, determined a stipulation to a reduced property tax assessment is equivalent to a judicial reduced assessment and is frozen at the reduced level for three years pursuant to Real Property Tax Law (RPTL) 727:

RPTL 727 (1) provides in relevant part that, “[e]xcept as hereinafter provided, . . . where an assessment being reviewed pursuant to this article is found to be unlawful, unequal, excessive or misclassified by final court order or judgment, the assessed valuation so determined shall not be changed for such property for the next three succeeding assessment rolls prepared on the basis of the three taxable status dates next occurring on or after the taxable status date of the most recent assessment under review in the proceeding subject to such final order or judgment. Where the assessor or other local official having custody and control of the assessment roll receives notice of the order or judgment subsequent to the filing of the next assessment roll, he or she is authorized and directed to correct the entry of assessed valuation on the assessment roll to conform to the provisions of this section.”

…[T]he statute imposes a three-year freeze of the assessment where an order or judgment is issued determining that the assessment is unlawful, unequal, excessive, or misclassified … . Where, as here, there is a stipulation between the parties agreeing to a lower assessment, the stipulation has the same effect as a judicial determination that the assessment is unlawful, unequal, excessive, or misclassified … . The three-year freeze applies to the “next three succeeding assessment rolls” from the “date of the most recent assessment under review” (RPTL 727 [1]). Here, the assessment under review was the 2007 tax year, and therefore the next three succeeding assessment rolls, i.e., from 2008 through 2010, must have that same assessment. The second sentence of RPTL 727 (1), which was added a few years after the statute was enacted, specifically addresses the situation in which the assessor receives the order or judgment after the next assessment roll has already been filed. In that case, the assessor is directed to correct the assessed valuation “to conform to” the requirements of RPTL 727. Once the assessment has been corrected, the property owner may make an application for a refund (see RPTL 726 [1] [c]). Therefore, the application of RPTL 727 (1) in this case resulted in an automatic reduction in the assessment for the 2008-2009 school tax year, without the need for any filing of a tax certiorari proceeding by petitioner.  Matter of The Torok Trust v Town Bd. of Town of Alexandria, 2015 NY Slip Op 02632, 4th Dept 3-27-15

 

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