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Criteria for Intervention as of Right and Permission to Intervene Explained (Not Met Here)

The Third Department determined a fund, which was entitled to reimbursement from any damages awarded plaintiff in a pending medical malpractice action, did not have the right to intervene and was properly denied permission to intervene in the medical malpractice action.  The court explained the relevant analytical criteria:

As relevant here, any person may intervene as of right “when the representation of the person’s interest by the parties is or may be inadequate and the person is or may be bound by the judgment” (CPLR 1012 [a] [2]). The Fund would be bound by any judgment because plaintiff has sought to recover medical costs, as well as other damages, in his complaints in these actions. Despite the Fund’s argument, however, it appears that plaintiff is and will adequately represent the Fund’s interests. At oral argument, the Fund acknowledged that plaintiff’s counsel is competent and will act in good faith. Plaintiff has an incentive to maximize his recovery, considering that he will not receive anything personally if he obtains a settlement or verdict of $537,273.12 or less. Plaintiff is also contractually bound to protect the Fund’s right to subrogation and has agreed to a lien on any recovery … . Supreme Court correctly found that plaintiff is adequately representing the Fund’s interests, and any argument that plaintiff may not do so in the future is pure speculation … .

A court may permit intervention, in its discretion, when the person’s claim has a common question of law or fact with the main action, but “the court shall consider whether the intervention will unduly delay the determination of the action or prejudice the substantial rights of any party” (CPLR 1013). Although the Fund’s asserted claim has common questions of law and fact with plaintiff’s claims, intervention was properly denied. Intervention would cause some delay because it would lead to duplicative discovery and motion practice, as the Fund and plaintiff could each separately seek demands and relief from the multiple defendants … . This could also cause some prejudice to defendants, who would be required to respond to similar repetitive demands and motions, as well as the possibility of the Fund calling additional witnesses or even experts at trial. The Court of Appeals has even acknowledged that allowing a provider of medical benefit payments to intervene could create tension between the injured party and his or her insurer,… and “inevitably complicates settlement negotiations” … . Mavente v Albany Med. Ctr. Hosp., 2015 NY Slip Op 01849, 3rd Dept 3-5-15

 

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