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“To a Reasonable Degree of Medical Probability” Properly States the Standard for Expert Opinion on Proximate Cause

The Second Department noted that it was sufficient that the expert stated there was “a reasonable degree of medical probability” plaintiff’s injury was caused by the accident:

The usual language is “to a reasonable degree of medical certainty,” but the phrase “degree of medical certainty” has been deemed sufficient (see Matott v Ward, 48 NY2d 455, 459). In Matott, the Court of Appeals held that the relevant inquiry is “whether it is reasonably apparent’ that the doctor intends to signify a probability supported by some rational basis'” (id. at 461 …). Here, the phrase “reasonable degree of medical probability” satisfied that standard. It should also be noted that that language is the statutory standard in New Jersey for determining if there is sufficient evidence of serious injury to sue for noneconomic loss (NJ Stat § 39:6A-8[a]…). Further, [the expert] explained the foundation for his opinion, noting that the plaintiff initially appeared at an early stage of his condition immediately after the accident, and that his condition progressed thereafter … . Thus, his opinion was supported by a rational basis … . Kahvejian v Pardo, 2015 NY Slip Op 01612, 2nd Dept 2-25-15

 

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