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Motion for Discontinuance Without Prejudice Should Not Have Been Granted Because It Allowed Movant to Escape Potentially Adverse Determinations

The Second Department determined Supreme Court should not have granted plaintiffs’ motion for a discontinuance without prejudice, a motion made in response to defendant’s (Parkway’s) motion to dismiss for failure to respond to Parkway’s 90-day notice:

“A motion for leave to discontinue an action without prejudice should be granted unless there are reasons which would justify its denial” … . Such a determination “rests within the sound discretion of the court,” and the motion should be granted “[i]n the absence of special circumstances, such as prejudice to a substantial right of the defendant, or other improper consequences” …, including an adverse determination of the court …, or the consequences of a potentially adverse determination … .

Here, the plaintiffs cross-moved, inter alia, for leave to discontinue the action without prejudice in response to Parkway’s separate motion pursuant to CPLR 3216 to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the plaintiffs had failed to timely respond to its 90-day notice. The Supreme Court’s determination to grant that branch of the plaintiffs’ cross motion which was for leave to discontinue the action without prejudice allowed the plaintiffs to avoid the potentially adverse consequences of having failed to timely respond to Parkway’s 90-day notice (see CPLR 3216), and an adverse determination of Parkway’s motion for summary judgment. Baez v Parkway Mobile Homes Inc, 2015 NY Slip Op 01596, 2nd Dept 2-25-15

 

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