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“Special Exception Permit” Defined

In affirming the denial of an application for a “special exception permit,” the Second Department explained the relevant criteria:

A “special exception gives permission to use property in a way that is consistent with the zoning ordinance, although not necessarily allowed as of right” … . The burden on an owner in seeking a special exception permit is, therefore, “considerably less” than the burden on an owner seeking a use variance … . An applicant for a special exception permit need only show that it has complied with every legislatively imposed condition on the permitted use … . If the applicant fails to comply with any of the conditions set forth in the ordinance, the zoning authority may deny the application … . Matter of Nathan v Board of Appeals of Town of Hempstead, 2015 NY Slip Op 01457, 2nd Dept 2-18-15

 

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