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Town Board and Police Commission Members Entitled to Immunity and Qualified Privilege Re: Defamation Causes of Action—Criteria Described/Power to Terminate Probationary Police Officer Described

The Fourth Department determined statements attributed to members of the town board and police commission with respect to the reasons for plaintiff’s termination as a probationary police officer were protected by governmental immunity and qualified privilege (explaining the relevant criteria).  In addition, the court explained the power to terminate a probationary police officer:

There is complete immunity from liability for defamation for ” an official [who] is a principal executive of State or local government who is entrusted by law with administrative or executive policy-making responsibilities of considerable dimension’ . . . , with respect to statements made during the discharge of those responsibilities about matters which come within the ambit of those duties” … . Here, the Town Board has the statutory authority to “make, adopt and enforce rules, orders and regulations for the government, discipline, administration and disposition of the police department and of the members thereof” (Town Law § 154) and, as members of the Police Commission, [defendants] were delegated “all the powers relative to police matters conferred upon the town board” (§ 150 [2]). We therefore conclude that Brooks, Sullivan, and Ulinski were entitled to absolute immunity because “members of the Town Board enjoy an absolute privilege against a claim of defamation where . . . the defamatory statements are made in the discharge of their responsibilities about matters within the ambit of their duties” …, and “[t]he privilege of absolute immunity . . . extends to those of subordinate rank who exercise delegated powers’ ” … . …

A qualified privilege arises when a person makes a good[ ]faith, bona fide communication upon a subject in which he or she has an interest, or a legal, moral or societal interest to speak, and the communication is made to a person with a corresponding interest’ ” … . Here, defendants submitted evidence that, at the time of the alleged slanderous communications, Ulinski was a member of the Police Commission and, therefore, had an interest in plaintiff’s performance as a probationary police officer, and that Ulinski made the communications to persons with a corresponding interest in plaintiff’s performance, namely to a member of the Town Board, and to the president of the union that represented plaintiff … . We further conclude that plaintiffs “failed to raise a triable issue of fact whether the statements were motivated solely by malice” … . * * *

As a probationary police officer, plaintiff could be ” dismissed for almost any reason, or for no reason at all[,]’ . . . [and he] had no right to challenge the termination by way of a hearing or otherwise, absent a showing that he was dismissed in bad faith or for an improper or impermissible reason” … . Fiore v Town of Whitestown, 2015 NY Slip Op 01361, 4th Dept 2-13-15

 

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