You are here: / / Question of Fact Whether Infant Plaintiff’s Injuries Were the Result...
,

Question of Fact Whether Infant Plaintiff’s Injuries Were the Result of Negligent Supervision at a Summer Camp

The Second Department determined there was a question of fact whether infant plaintiff was properly supervised by camp personnel when she attempted to jump from a platform to a monkey bar and slipped off:

” [S]chools and camps owe a duty to supervise their charges and will only be held liable for foreseeable injuries proximately caused by the absence of adequate supervision'” … . Whether such supervision was adequate and, if inadequate, whether it was a proximate cause of the subject injuries are generally questions for the trier of fact to resolve … .

Here, the defendant failed to establish, prima facie, that it provided adequate supervision to the infant plaintiff, or that lack of adequate supervision was not a proximate cause of the infant plaintiff’s injuries … . DiGiacomo v Town of Babylon, 2015 NY Slip Op 00722, 2nd Dept 1-28-15

 

You might also like
THE REFEREE’S FINDINGS WERE BASED UPON INADMISSIBLE HEARSAY, JUDGMENT OF FORECLOSURE REVERSED (SECOND DEPT).
SUPREME COURT SHOULD NOT HAVE, SUA SPONTE, REVOKED THE ACCELERATION OF THE DEBT IN THIS FORECLOSURE CASE BECAUSE PLAINTIFF DID NOT SEEK THAT RELIEF (SECOND DEPT).
THE PURPORTED REFORMATION OF THE INSURANCE CONTRACT TO REDUCE COVERAGE AFTER THE TRAFFIC ACCIDENT OCCURRED IS UNENFORCEABLE, THE INSURER IS LIABLE FOR THE ORIGINAL COVERAGE AMOUNT (SECOND DEPT).
JUDGE’S IMPROPER COMMENTS CONCERNING PLAINTIFF’S EXPERT WARRANTED A NEW TRIAL ON DAMAGES.
ALTHOUGH THE TEN-YEAR DELAY BETWEEN THE JUDGMENT OF FORECLOSURE AND THE SALE OF THE PROPERTY WAS NOT WRONGFUL, THE DEFENDANT SHOULD NOT BE REQUIRED TO PAY THE INTEREST ACCRUED DURING THE DELAY (SECOND DEPT).
ALTHOUGH THE VEHICLE OWNER, HERE A CAR DEALERSHIP, IS USUALLY VICARIOUSLY LIABLE FOR AN ACCIDENT CAUSED BY A DRIVER OPERATING THE VEHICLE WITH THE OWNER’S PERMISSION, HERE THERE IS A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE DRIVER, WHO WAS TEST DRIVING THE VEHICLE, EXCEEDED THE SCOPE OF THE PERMISSION (SECOND DEPT).
PLAINTIFF DID NOT PROVIDE SUFFICIENT PROOF IT HAD NOTIFIED DEFENDANT OF THE FORECLOSURE ACTION PURSUANT TO RPAPL 1304, DEFENDANT’S SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
BANK WAS ENTITLED TO A LIEN ON THE SUBJECT PROPERTY PURSUANT TO THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE SUBROGATION (SECOND DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

Code Provision Which Requires Abutting Landowners to Keep a Sidewalk in Good... Purchaser of Real Property, Who Is Aware of a Pending Lawsuit Involving the...