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“General Supervisory Authority” Over Work Not Sufficient to Impose Liability Under the Labor Law

In affirming summary judgment in favor of the defendants, the Second Department described the nature of work-supervision necessary to hold a defendant liable under Labor Law 240 (1), 241 (6), 200 and common-law negligence theories.  “General supervisory authority” is not enough to impose liability:

“Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6) apply to owners, contractors, and their agents” … . “A party is deemed to be an agent of an owner or general contractor under the Labor Law when it has supervisory control and authority over the work being done where a plaintiff is injured” … . “Similarly, where, as here, a claim against a defendant arises out of alleged defects or dangers in the methods or materials of the work, recovery cannot be had under Labor Law § 200 or pursuant to the principles of common-law negligence unless it is shown that the party to be charged under that theory of liability had the authority to supervise or control the performance of the work” … . * * *

Here, the defendants established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the causes of action alleging violations of Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6) by establishing that they were not owners, contractors, or statutory agents under those provisions … . The defendants also established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the causes of action alleging violations of Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence through the submission of evidence which demonstrated that they did not have the authority to supervise or control the manner in which the injured plaintiff performed his work … .

To the extent that the defendants had general supervisory authority over the work, this was insufficient in itself to impose liability under the Labor Law … . Fucci v Plotke, 2015 NY Slip Op 00726, 2nd Dept 1-28-15

 

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