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Safety Regulation Asserted to Be the Basis of the Labor Law 241 (6) Cause of Action Did Not Apply to the Defect Which Caused the Injury

The Third Department determined plaintiff’s injury from his use of a utility knife did not entitle him to recovery pursuant to Labor Law 241 (6).  The safety regulation alleged to have been violated prohibited a contractor from supplying tools with split or loose handles.  The problem with the utility knife was a loose locking mechanism.  The court refused to stretch the meaning of “loose or split handles” to include a loose locking mechanism:

Plaintiffs allege in their bill of particulars that defendant violated 12 NYCRR 23-1.10 (a), which states, in pertinent part, that unpowered hand tools with “[s]plit or loose tool handles shall not be used.” Notably, this regulatory provision does not merely impose a general duty to keep unpowered hand tools in a “safe,” “proper” or “adequate” condition …, nor does it proscribe the usage of hand tools with “unsafe” or “defective” handles, but, rather, specifically prohibits the use of hand tools with “[s]plit or loose . . . handles.”

Having determined that plaintiffs have asserted a violation of a regulatory provision that “‘sets forth a specific standard of conduct'” for general contractors and owners …, thereby providing a predicate basis for a claim under Labor Law § 241 (6), we are left to decide whether the regulation applies to the facts presented in this case [FN2]. Plaintiff explained during his examination before trial that, while he was cutting a piece of plastic with a utility knife, the locking mechanism that secures the retractable blade was loose, causing the blade to break in half and cut plaintiff’s wrist. Whether the dysfunctional locking mechanism can fairly be considered to be a “[s]plit or loose tool handle[]” is a question of law to be decided by the courts … . A fair reading of the regulation upon which plaintiffs rely, however, does not compel us to conclude that the looseness of the locking mechanism — an internal component of the knife and not a visible or functional part of the handle itself — was what the Commissioner of Labor had contemplated in his promulgation of 12 NYCRR 23-1.10 (a) … . We are well aware that the Industrial Code “should be sensibly interpreted and applied to effectuate its purpose of protecting construction laborers against hazards in the workplace” … . However, while the regulation sets forth a strict prohibition against using tools that have loose or split handles, it makes no mention whatsoever of the locking mechanism found within a hand tool, and we are thus constrained to determine that it is inapplicable. Boots v Bette & Cring LLC, 2015 NY Slip Op 00588, 3rd Dept 1-22-15

 

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