New York Appellate Digest
  • Home
  • About
  • Just Released
  • Update Service
  • Streamlined Research
  • CLE Courses
  • Contact
  • Menu Menu
You are here: Home1 / Contract Law2 / “Warranty” Need Not Be Set Forth In Any Special Manner—Here...
Contract Law, Insurance Law

“Warranty” Need Not Be Set Forth In Any Special Manner—Here the Language on the Declaration Page that “Warranted” a Fire Alarm Will Be “Fully Operational” Was a Valid Condition Precedent to the Insured’s Liability—Summary Judgment In Favor of Insurer Properly Granted

The Second Department determined the language on the declaration page of a fire insurance policy constituted a “warranty” that the fire alarm will be “fully operational,” meaning that the alarm must be activated at the time of the fire or coverage can be disclaimed The alarm was not activated at the time of the fire and defendant’s motion for summary judgment was therefore properly granted:

Insurance Law § 3106(a) provides:

“In this section warranty means any provision of an insurance contract which has the effect of requiring, as a condition precedent of the taking effect of such contract or as a condition precedent of the insurer’s liability thereunder, the existence of a fact which tends to diminish, or the non-existence of a fact which tends to increase, the risk of the occurrence of any loss, damage, or injury within the coverage of the contract” (Insurance Law § 3106[a] [emphasis added]).

“As a general matter, warranties represent a promise by the insured to do or not to do some thing that the insurer considers significant to its risk of liability under an insurance contract” … . Here, the provision in the “special conditions” section of the declaration page which states “[w]arranted . . . burglar alarm[] will be [f]ully operational throughout the period of the policy” meets the definition of a warranty pursuant to the Insurance Law, since requiring the plaintiff to have a fully operational burglar alarm would be significant to the defendant’s risk of liability under the insurance policy. Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, there is no requirement that the warranty be set forth in any particular manner, as long as its effect is to create a condition precedent to the insurer’s liability. Indeed, the use of the term “warranted” at the beginning of the subject provision establishes that the provision was a warranty as defined by the Insurance Law … . Triple Diamond Cafe Inc v Those Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London, 2015 NY Slip Op 00527, 2nd Dept 1-21-15

 

January 21, 2015
Tags: Second Department
Share this entry
  • Share on WhatsApp
https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png 0 0 CurlyHost https://www.newyorkappellatedigest.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/NYAppelateLogo-White-1.png CurlyHost2015-01-21 18:13:002020-02-06 15:36:05“Warranty” Need Not Be Set Forth In Any Special Manner—Here the Language on the Declaration Page that “Warranted” a Fire Alarm Will Be “Fully Operational” Was a Valid Condition Precedent to the Insured’s Liability—Summary Judgment In Favor of Insurer Properly Granted
You might also like
Criteria for Intervention Described
DISPUTE ABOUT VOTES FOR THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF A RELIGIOUS CORPORATION PROPERLY RESOLVED BY THE COURTS, THE MATTER DID NOT REQUIRE CONSIDERATION OF RELIGIOUS ISSUES (SECOND DEPT).
THE PLAINTIFF BICYCLIST COULD NOT IDENTIFY THE CAUSE OF HIS FALL AND THE CITY DID NOT HAVE WRITTEN NOTICE OF ANY ROADWAY DEFECTS IN THE AREA; DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT).
PLAINTIFF BANK DID NOT SEND THE 90-DAY FORECLOSURE NOTICE IN A SEPARATE ENVELOPE AS REQUIRED BY RPAPL 1304; THEREFORE THE BANK’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED AND DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (SECOND DEPT). ​
THE DEFENDANT RETAIL STORE IN THIS SLIP AND FALL CASE DID NOT DEMONSTRATE IT DID NOT HAVE CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF AND/OR CREATE THE DANGEROUS CONDITION (A PUDDLE OF LIQUID) WHICH CAUSED PLAINTIFF’S SLIP AND FALL (SECOND DEPT).
PLAINTIFFS’ EXPERT DID NOT SPECIALIZE IN THE RELEVANT AREA OF MEDICINE, HIS AFFIDAVIT THEREFORE DID NOT RAISE A QUESTION OF FACT, THERE WAS A QUESTION OF FACT WHETHER THE EMERGENCY EXCEPTION APPLIED TO THE GENERAL RULE A HOSPITAL IS NOT LIABLE FOR THE TREATMENT PROVIDED BY PRIVATE ATTENDING PHYSICIANS (SECOND DEPT).
Remarks Made In the Course of Litigation Privileged
Emergency Power to Demolish a Building Properly Exercised

Categories

  • Abuse of Process
  • Account Stated
  • Accountant Malpractice
  • Administrative Law
  • Agency
  • Animal Law
  • Appeals
  • Arbitration
  • Architectural Malpractice
  • Associations
  • Attorneys
  • Banking Law
  • Bankruptcy
  • Battery
  • Chiropractor Malpractice
  • Civil Commitment
  • Civil Conspiracy
  • Civil Forfeiture
  • Civil Procedure
  • Civil Rights Law
  • Condominium Corporations
  • Condominiums
  • Constitutional Law
  • Consumer Law
  • Contempt
  • Contract Law
  • Conversion
  • Cooperatives
  • Copyright
  • Corporation Law
  • Correction Law
  • County Law
  • Court of Claims
  • Criminal Law
  • Debtor-Creditor
  • Defamation
  • Dental Malpractice
  • Disciplinary Hearings (Inmates)
  • Education-School Law
  • Election Law
  • Eminent Domain
  • Employment Law
  • Engineering Malpractice
  • Environmental Law
  • Equitable Recoupment
  • Evidence
  • Fair Credit Reporting Act
  • Fair Housing Act
  • Fair Housing Amendments Act
  • False Arrest
  • False Claims Act
  • False Imprisonment
  • Family Law
  • Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA)
  • Fiduciary Duty
  • Foreclosure
  • Fraud
  • Freedom of Information Law (FOIL)
  • Human Rights Law
  • Immigration Law
  • Immunity
  • Indian Law
  • Insurance Law
  • Intellectual Property
  • Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
  • Involuntary Medical Treatment and Feeding (Inmates)
  • Judges
  • Labor Law
  • Labor Law-Construction Law
  • Land Use
  • Landlord-Tenant
  • Legal Malpractice
  • Lien Law
  • Limited Liability Company Law
  • Longshoreman's and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act
  • Malicious Prosecution
  • Maritime Law
  • Medicaid
  • Medical Malpractice
  • Mental Hygiene Law
  • Military Law
  • Money Had and Received
  • Municipal Law
  • Navigation Law
  • Negligence
  • Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
  • Negligent Misrepresentation
  • Notarial Misconduct
  • Nuisance
  • Partnership Law
  • Personal Property
  • Pharmacist Malpractice
  • Physician Patient Confidentiality
  • Pistol Permits
  • Prima Facie Tort
  • Private Nuisance
  • Privilege
  • Products Liability
  • Professional Malpractice
  • Public Authorities Law
  • Public Corporations
  • Public Health Law
  • Public Nuisance
  • Real Estate
  • Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law (RPAPL)
  • Real Property Law
  • Real Property Tax Law
  • Religion
  • Replevin
  • Retirement and Social Security Law
  • Securities
  • Sepulcher
  • Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA)
  • Social Services Law
  • Statutes
  • Tax Law
  • Tenant Harassment
  • Tortious Interference with Contract
  • Tortious Interference with Employment
  • Tortious Interference with Prospective Business Relations
  • Tortious Interference With Prospective Economic Advantage
  • Town Law
  • Toxic Torts
  • Trade Secrets
  • Trademarks
  • Trespass
  • Trusts and Estates
  • Uncategorized
  • Unemployment Insurance
  • Unfair Competition
  • Uniform Commercial Code
  • Usury
  • Utilities
  • Vehicle and Traffic Law
  • Victims of Gender-Motivated Violence Protection Law (VGM)
  • Village Law
  • Water Law
  • Workers' Compensation
  • Zoning

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2025 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

Conviction Reversed—Court Denied For Cause Challenge to Biased Juror Without... Failure to Warn Defendant His Guilty Plea Could Lead to Deportation, Prior to...
Scroll to top