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Twenty-Day Time-Limit for Making an Application to Stay Arbitration Starts When the Notice or Demand for Arbitration Is Received, Not When It Is Mailed/An Application for a Stay of Arbitration Is “Made” When It Is Filed/Appellate Court May Consider a Purely Legal Issue Raised for the First Time on Appeal

The First Department determined the twenty-day time-limit for an application to stay arbitration, when the notice or demand for arbitration is sent by mail, runs from the date the notice or demand is actually received.  The court further noted that it can rule on a purely legal question raised for the first time on appeal:

Even though CPLR 7503(c) says, “An application to stay arbitration must be made by the party served [with a notice or demand for arbitration] within twenty days after service upon him of the notice or demand” (emphasis added), case law establishes that, when the notice or demand is mailed — as it was in the case at bar — “[t]he notice to arbitrate does not start the time to respond until receipt”… . * * *

The issue of whether an application to stay arbitration is “made” (CPLR 7503[c]) when the petition is filed, as opposed to when it is served, is a purely legal one; hence, it “may properly be considered by this Court for the first time on appeal” … . In fact, an application is made when the petition is filed … . Matter of Travelers Prop Cas Co of Am v Archibald, 2015 NY Slip Op 00465, 1st Dept 1-20-15

 

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