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In an Employment Discrimination Case, Plaintiff Is a Member of a Protected Class By Virtue of His Wife’s Religion

The Second Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Leventhal, over a dissent, determined plaintiff had raised a question of fact whether he was the subject of employment discrimination in violation of the Executive Law (State Human Rights Law).  Plaintiff’s wife is Jewish and plaintiff is not. Plaintiff’s co-workers are alleged to have made anti-Semitic remarks and plaintiff alleged his firing was a manifestation of discrimination against members of the Jewish faith.  The question of first impression before the court was whether plaintiff is a member of a protected class by virtue of his wife’s religion.  The Second Department found that he is:

To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the State Human Rights Law, a plaintiff who has been terminated from employment must demonstrate (1) that he or she is a member of the class protected by the statute, (2) that he or she was actively or constructively discharged, (3) that he or she was qualified to hold the position from which he or she was terminated, and (4) that the discharge occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination … . * * *

The defendants assert that there is no authority to support a claim of discrimination based upon the religious belief of a spouse under the State Human Rights Law. While there is no authority addressing this issue under the State Human Rights Law, several federal courts have construed Title VII to protect individuals “who are the victims of discriminatory animus towards third persons with whom the individuals associate” … . * * *

While the plaintiffs’ allegations call to mind the infamous Nuremberg Laws enacted in 1935, which stripped German Jews of their civil rights and citizenship and prohibited persons of “German or related blood” from marrying or having sexual relations with German Jews, we are aware that the defendants’ alleged conduct is not akin to Town-initiated discrimination. State Human Rights Law claims under Executive Law § 296 are “analytically identical to claims brought under Title VII” …, and thus we see no reason to construe the State statute more restrictively than the federal statute. Accordingly, the plaintiff sufficiently demonstrated his membership in a protected class by virtue of the defendants’ alleged discriminatory conduct stemming from his marriage to a Jewish person. Indeed, we note that discrimination against an individual based on his or her association with a member of a protected class also constitutes an infringement upon that individual’s First Amendment right to intimate association, which receives protection as a fundamental element of personal liberty (see Roberts v United States Jaycees, 468 US 609, 617-618 [“choices to enter into and maintain certain intimate human relationships must be secured against undue intrusion by the State because of the role of such relationships in safeguarding the individual freedom that is central to our constitutional scheme”]; Matusick v Erie County Water Auth., 757 F3d 31 [2d Cir] [where plaintiff, a white male, alleged that he was discriminated against and terminated from his employment because of his engagement to an African-American female, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recognized, for the first time, that a constitutionally protected right to intimate association based upon marriage engagement could be the predicate for a claim that the defendants, while acting under color of state law, deprived the plaintiff of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights in violation of 42 USC § 1983]). Chiara v Town of New Castle, 2015 NY Slip Op 00326, 2nd Dept 1-14-15

 

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