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Charging an Additional 10% Contingency Fee for the Appeal, On Top of the 33 1/3% Contingency Fee for the Trial, for a Total Contingency Fee of 43 1/3 %, Was Proper—Motion Court Did Not Have the Power to Alter the Fee Agreement Sua Sponte and the Motion Court No Longer Had Jurisdiction Over the Case When It Made the Alteration

The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Manzanet-Daniels, over a dissent, discussed several fundamental issues in reversing Supreme Court's sua sponte award of attorney's fees which differed from the fee agreed to by the plaintiff and the plaintiff's law firm.  The First department held that the 33 1/3% contingency fee for the trial, and an additional 10% contingency for the appeal, amounting to a 43 !/3 % contingency fee, was proper. In addition, the First Department determined the defendant did not have standing to contest the fee, Supreme Court did not have the power to adjust the fee and Supreme Court no longer had jurisdiction over the case at the time it did so:

Initially, we note that defendant has no standing to challenge the fees agreed upon as between plaintiff and his counsel. CPLR 5015(a)(3) provides that “[t]he court which rendered a judgment or order may relieve a party from it upon such terms as may be just, on motion of any interested person . . . upon the ground of . . . fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party (emphasis added).” Defendant is not an “interested person” within the meaning of the statute, as even the motion court appeared to recognize. Defendant will pay the same amounts pursuant to the judgment regardless of the division of fees as between plaintiff and his counsel. …

Further, there is no evidence whatsoever that the judgment was procured by fraud, misrepresentation or other misconduct by plaintiff or his attorneys. …

Defendant having no standing under CPLR 5015(a)(3) to challenge the separate fee for appellate work, the court relied on its “inherent authority” to reach the issue. A court, however, has no inherent authority to sua sponte reach the issue of attorneys' fees … .

Moreover, Supreme Court was without jurisdiction to revisit the issue of the propriety of the fees, even upon the motion of a proper party. Since the Court of Appeals denied applications for review … the judgment was final, and Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to, in effect, reverse the Court by modifying the judgment … .

Plaintiff's expert, a leading expert on legal ethics, opined that it was legally and ethically permissible for the firm to collect a separate fee for appellate work, notwithstanding that the firm is entitled, under the original retainer, to a contingency fee of one third of the recovery. Plaintiff's expert opined that limiting counsel's contingent fee to that encompassed in the initial retainer “does not advance the purpose behind Section 603.7 [Rules of the Appellate Division] . . . i.e., protecting clients from gouging by attorneys.” The expert also observed that had plaintiff chosen to retain new counsel for the appeal, there would be absolutely no question that the new counsel would be entitled to a fee for his or her work, notwithstanding the fact that trial counsel was entitled to receive 33 1/3% of any recovery. Plaintiff's expert noted that it would be “anomalous” to assert that trial counsel should be compensated less favorably than new counsel for performing the work that had not been contemplated by the initial retainer. Stewart v New York City Tr Auth, 2014 NY Slip Op 09063, 1st Dept 12-30-14


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