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Violation of Labor Law Can Serve as a Basis for a Damages Action by a Police Officer Against the City Re: Injuries Suffered on the Job

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Rivera, over a dissent, determined that a violation of Labor Law 27-a can serve as the basis of a damages action by a police officer injured while on the job.  Plaintiff officer was injured when she fell off a truck while loading wooden barricades:

With [the] understanding of the legislative intent to give broad application to GML § 205-e, we turn to defendants' challenge to plaintiff's cause of action for damages. To succeed on their summary judgment motion, defendants must establish “a prima facie showing of entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, tendering sufficient evidence to demonstrate the absence of any material issues of fact” … . For the reasons we discuss, defendants have failed to meet their burden.

In order to assert a claim under GML § 205-e, a plaintiff “must [1] identify the statute or ordinance with which the defendant failed to comply, [2] describe the manner in which the [police officer] was injured, and [3] set forth those facts from which it may be inferred that the defendant's negligence directly or indirectly caused the harm” … . Defendants allege plaintiff cannot satisfy the first requirement because the Labor Law may not serve as a basis for her cause of action. We disagree.

As a predicate to her GML damages cause of action plaintiff relies specifically on Labor Law § 27-a (3) (a) (1), which provides that “[e]very employer shall: (1) furnish to each of its employees, employment and a place of employment which are free from recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to its employees and which will provide reasonable and adequate protection to the lives, safety or health of its employees.”

Defendants counter that because [Labor Law 27-a] lacks a private right of action plaintiff cannot base her GML § 205-e claim on section 27-a. However, that is exactly what GML § 205-e permits and what the Legislature intended. While it is true that [the Labor Law]  does not contain an express private right of action …, GML § 205-e does not require that the predicate for a police officer's action contain an existing right to sue. Gammons v City of New York, 2014 NY Slip Op 08869, CtApp 12-18-14

 

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