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Code Provision Prohibiting the Placement of Signs on Public Property Is a Constitutional, Content-Neutral Restriction of Speech Which Was Severable from the Rest of the Code Chapter—There Was, Therefore, No Need to Assess the Constitutionality of the Entire Chapter (As the Appellate Division Had)

Reversing the Appellate Division, the Court of Appeals determined that section 57A-11 of the Town Code, which prohibited the placement of signs on public property, could be severed from the rest of chapter and was a valid, content-neutral regulation of speech.  The Appellate Division had held that section 57A-11, which was valid standing on its own, could not be severed from the rest of the chapter and that the chapter as a whole was unconstitutional because it favored commercial over noncommercial speech. The defendant here had pled guilty to violating section 57A-11:

“In a statutory context, our test for severability has been whether the Legislature would have wished the statute to be enforced with the invalid part exscinded, or rejected altogether” … . In Superfund Coalition, for example, the unconstitutional portion was at the “core” of the statute, and “interwoven inextricably through the entire regulatory scheme” (id.). By contrast, section 57A-11 deals only with signs posted on public property, a discrete regulatory topic and regime. This is reinforced by section 57A-11 (A), which explains the provision’s purpose and focuses entirely on the unique problems posed by signs on public right-of-ways. In light of section 57A-11’s independent legislative purpose, this provision can be severed from any unconstitutional portions of chapter 57A. We therefore need not and do not consider the constitutionality of any part of chapter 57A except section 57A-11. * * *

Section 57A-11 of the Town Code * * * imposes a content- neutral ban on all signs on public property, and applies to both commercial and non-commercial signs without consideration of their content. Further, it directly serves the Town’s valid interests in traffic safety and aesthetics, as expressly articulated in section 57A-11 (A). People v On Sight Mobile Opticians, 2014 NY Slip Op 08761, CtApp 12-16-14

 

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