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Gun Found In Juvenile’s Shoe (After Juvenile Was Told to Remove His Shoes) Should Have Been Suppressed—Juvenile Could Not Be Arrested and Detained for a Violation (Disorderly Conduct Is Not a Crime) and Nothing More than a Frisk Is Justified During a Temporary Detention Pending the Arrival of a Juvenile’s Parents

The Second Department, over a two-justice dissent, determined that the search of the 15-year-old appellant (Jamal) was illegal and the gun found in appellant's shoe should have been suppressed.  The appellant, who had already been searched twice, was being wrongfully detained on a disorderly conduct charge (a violation, not a crime) at the time he was told to take off his shoes:

CPL 140.10 permits a police officer to arrest a person for any “offense” that is committed in the officer's presence. The term “offense” is broadly defined to include conduct for which a sentence to a term of imprisonment or a fine is provided by state or local law (see Penal Law § 10.00 [1]). Family Court Act § 305.2(2), however, provides that “[a]n officer may take a child under the age of sixteen into custody without a warrant in cases in which he [or she] may arrest a person for a crime . . . .” The term “crime” includes only misdemeanors and felonies, not violations (see Penal Law § 10.00[6]). Accordingly, a search may be conducted where a juvenile is taken into custody for conduct which, if committed by an adult, would constitute a crime … . As disorderly conduct is not a crime, Family Court Act § 305.2(2) prohibited Jamal's warrantless arrest for that offense … . Based on this record, it is clear that upon learning that Jamal was a juvenile the police nonetheless kept him under arrest with no statutory authority for doing so. * * *

…[W]hen Jamal was being held pending his parents' arrival, he was under temporary detention as opposed to arrest. “A temporary detention justifies only a frisk, not a full-fledged search” … . The removal of Jamal's shoes was far more intrusive than a frisk or a patdown … . We find no merit to the presentment agency's argument that safety required the removal of Jamal's shoes. “The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness . . .” … . Considerations of safety provide no justification in this case where Jamal was continuously in police custody and had been searched twice before being directed to remove his shoes. It is of no moment that Jamal was directed to remove his shoes pursuant to an alleged standard procedure. “[A]n unreasonable search is not somehow rendered reasonable, and therefore constitutionally permissible, by the mere fact that a departmental procedure was followed” … . The standard of reasonableness still applies … . We recognize that in appropriate cases law enforcement officers are authorized to employ reasonable measures to guard against detainees' self-infliction of harm. Such reasonable measures may include the removal of belts and shoelaces … . Nonetheless, the removal of Jamal's shoes cannot be justified as a protective measure where, as noted above, he had been twice searched by police officers who had no reason to expect that he had “anything on him” or otherwise posed a danger. Matter of Jamal S, 2014 NY Slip Op 08470, 1st Dept 12-4-14

 

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