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Defendant’s Conviction Properly Reversed Because the Verdict Was Inconsistent/Repugnant—Charge Which Was the Subject of Conviction in the Inconsistent/Repugnant Verdict Can Be Presented to a New Grand Jury

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Read, determined that defendant’s conviction was properly reversed because the verdict was inconsistent/repugnant, but that the People should be allowed to resubmit that charge to a new grand jury. Defendant was convicted of manslaughter in the first degree as a hate crime, but the jury acquitted defendant of manslaughter in the first degree.  Because, to aquit, the jury must have found that at least one of the elements of manslaughter in the first degree was not proven, the manslaughter in the first degree as a hate crime necessarily suffered from the same failure of proof.  The People argued that the jury instructions gave the jurors the impression they could acquit on the non-hate-crime manslaughter and still find the defendant guilty of the hate-crime manslaughter:

The rationale for the repugnancy doctrine is that the defendant cannot be convicted when the jury actually finds, via a legally inconsistent split verdict, that the defendant did not commit an essential element of the crime … . Given that premise, “a verdict is repugnant only if it is legally impossible — under all conceivable circumstances — for the jury to have convicted the defendant on one count but not the other,” and, “[i]f there is a possible theory under which a split verdict could be legally permissible, it cannot be repugnant, regardless of whether that theory has evidentiary support in a particular case” … .

Accordingly, repugnancy does not depend on the evidence presented at trial or the record of the jury’s deliberative process, and “[t]he instructions to the jury will be examined only to determine whether the jury, as instructed, must have reached an inherently self-contradictory verdict” … . In making these determinations, it is inappropriate for the reviewing court to “attempt to divine the jury’s collective mental process” … . “Jurors are allowed to compromise, make mistakes, be confused or even extend mercy when rendering their verdicts” … . * * *

There is no constitutional or statutory provision that mandates dismissal for a repugnancy error. Given that New York’s repugnancy jurisprudence already affords defendants greater protection than required under the Federal Constitution, permitting a retrial on the repugnant charge upon which the jury convicted, but not on the charge of which the jury actually acquitted defendant, strikes a reasonable balance. This is particularly so given that a reviewing court can never know the reason for the repugnancy. Accordingly, the People may resubmit the crime of first-degree manslaughter as a hate crime to a new grand jury … . People v DeLee, 2014 NY Slip Op 08212, CtApp 11-24-14

 

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