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Work Performed by Plaintiff Was Not “Home Improvement”—No License Required

The Second Department affirmed Supreme Court’s finding that the installation of motorized window shades did not constitute “home improvement” and therefore plaintiff was not required to be licensed to perform the work.  If a license had been required by the Administrative Code of the City of New York, plaintiff would not have been able to recover under contract or quantum meruit:

“Where a home improvement contractor is not properly licensed in the municipality where the work is performed at the time the work is performed, the contractor forfeits the right to recover for the work performed both under the contract and on a quantum meruit basis” … . Here, contrary to the defendants’ contention, the Supreme Court properly determined that the plaintiff’s installation of motorized window shades in their condominium did not constitute “home improvement” work within the meaning of Administrative Code of the City of New York § 20-386(2)…). Rather, the plaintiff’s installation of motorized window shades constituted decorative work, which was not “incidental or related to” the separate home improvement renovations being performed by other contractors at the defendant’s condominium (Administrative Code of City of NY § 20-386[2]…). Schimko v Haley, 2014 NY Slip Op 07644, 2nd Dept 11-12-14

 

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