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Delay In Seeking DNA Sample Contributed to Violation of Speedy Trial Statute—Indictment Dismissed

The Second Department dismissed the indictment because the unexcused delay in seeking a DNA sample resulted in the violation of the speedy trial statute (CPL 30.30):

The defendant moved pursuant to CPL 30.30 to dismiss the indictment on the ground that he was deprived of his statutory right to a speedy trial. Contrary to the People’s contention, because the People failed to exercise due diligence in obtaining the DNA sample from the defendant, the 161-day period between June 5, 2009, and November 13, 2009, was not excludable on the ground that their need to obtain the DNA test results constituted excusable, exceptional circumstances (see CPL 30.30[4][g]…). Adding this period of time to the periods of delay correctly conceded by the People, the People exceeded the six-month period in which they were required to be ready for trial (see CPL 30.30[1][a]). Accordingly, the judgment must be reversed, the defendant’s motion pursuant to CPL 30.30 granted, and the indictment dismissed. People v Clarke, 2014 NY Slip Op 07680, 2nd Dept 11-12-14

 

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