Malicious Prosecution Requires Something More than Merely Reporting an Alleged Incident to Authorities/Uncorroborated, Incredible, Allegations by Plaintiff Did Not Raise a Question of Fact
The First Department, in a full-fledged opinion by Justice Richter, determined summary judgment in favor of the defendants was properly granted for malicious prosecution and defamation causes of action. Plaintiff, Moorhouse, had been charged with attempted rape of a hotel worker, G.P., and was acquitted. He then brought a civil suit alleging, among other causes of action, malicious prosecution and defamation. The First Department explained that plaintiff’s uncorroborated, incredible version of events, contradicted by eyewitness testimony which corroborated the hotel worker’s allegations, and the acquittal itself, did not raise a question of fact:
In the malicious prosecution cause of action, Moorhouse contends that G.P. initiated the criminal proceeding against him without probable cause and with malice … . The Court of Appeals has imposed “stringent requirements” for bringing malicious prosecution claims … . The Court explained that this is necessary “to effectuate the strong public policy of open access to the courts for all parties without fear of reprisal in the form of a retaliatory lawsuit” … . To prevail on such a claim, a plaintiff has a “heavy burden” …, and must establish the following four elements: “(1) the initiation of a criminal proceeding by the defendant against the plaintiff, (2) termination of the proceeding in favor of the accused, (3) lack of probable cause, and (4) malice” … . A plaintiff’s failure to prove any one of these elements will defeat the entire claim … .
A civilian who simply provides information to law enforcement authorities, who are then free to exercise their own independent judgment as to whether an arrest should be made and criminal charges filed, will generally not be held liable for malicious prosecution … . To establish the element of initiation of a criminal proceeding, it typically must be shown that the defendant did something “more than merely report a crime to the police and cooperate in its prosecution” … . Instead “[t]he defendant must have affirmatively induced the officer to act, such [*5]as taking an active part in the arrest and procuring it to be made or showing active, officious and undue zeal, to the point where the officer is not acting of his own volition” … . Moorhouse v Standard NY, 2014 NY Slip Op 07605, 1st Dept 11-6-14