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“Preamble” to Miranda Warnings Used In Queens County Undermined the Effectiveness of the Miranda Warnings—Defendants’ Statements Should Have Been Suppressed

The Court of Appeals, in a full-fledged opinion by Judge Read, over a dissent, determined that the “preamble” to the Miranda warnings used by the police and the District Attorney's staff in Queens County undermined the effectiveness of the warnings to the extent that the defendants (Dunbar and Lloyd-Douglass)  were not adequately and effectively advised of their Fifth Amendment right to avoid self-incrimination:

[The “preamble” was as follows:]

“If you have an alibi, give me as much information as you can, including the names of any people you were with.

“If your version of what happened is different from what we've been told, this is your opportunity to tell us your story.

“If there is something you need us to investigate about this case you have to tell us now so we can look into it.

“Even if you have already spoken to someone else you do not have to talk to us.

“This will be your only opportunity to speak with us before you go to court on these charges.” * * *

Before they were read their Miranda rights, Dunbar and Lloyd-Douglas were warned, for all intents and purposes, that remaining silent or invoking the right to counsel would come at a price —they would be giving up a valuable opportunity to speak with an assistant district attorney, to have their cases investigated or to assert alibi defenses. The statements to “give me as much information as you can,” that “this is your opportunity to tell us your story” and that you “have to tell us now” directly contradicted the later warning that they had the right to remain silent. By advising them that speaking would facilitate an investigation, the interrogators implied that these defendants' words would be used to help them, thus undoing the heart of the warning that anything they said could and would be used against them. And the statement that the prearraignment interrogation was their “only opportunity” to speak falsely suggested that requesting counsel would cause them to lose the chance to talk to an assistant district attorney.

In sum, the issue in these cases is not whether, under the totality of the circumstances, these defendants' waivers were valid, but rather whether or not they were ever “clearly informed” of their Miranda rights in the first place, as is constitutionally required. We agree with the Appellate Division that they were not: the preamble undercut the meaning of all four Miranda warnings, depriving Dunbar and Lloyd-Douglas of an effective explanation of their rights. People v Dunbar, 2014 NY Slip Op 07293, CtApp 10-28-14

 

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