You are here: / / Organizations Representing Lakeshore Residents Should Have Been Allowed...
,

Organizations Representing Lakeshore Residents Should Have Been Allowed to Intervene in an Action Concerning Regulation of Lake Water Levels (Dictated by an 80-Year-Old Injunction)—Neither the Doctrine of Collateral Estoppel Nor Laches Was a Bar to the Relief Sought by the Lakeshore Residents

The Third Department determined Supreme Court should have allowed organizations representing hundreds of lakeshore residents (PLA and Sandy Knolls) to intervene in an Article 78/declaratory judgment proceeding concerning an 80-year-old injunction re: the operation of a dam to control water levels in the lake.  The court held that the neither the doctrine of collateral estoppel nor laches was a bar to the relief sought by the lakeshore residents:

“Pursuant to CPLR 7802 (d), a court may allow other interested persons to intervene” in proceedings brought against public agencies … . Further, intervention is to be granted as of right in any action or proceeding where a nonparty demonstrates that its interest in the matter is not being duly represented and the nonparty may be “bound by the judgment” (CPLR 1012 [a] [2]) or, alternatively, may be permitted by the court “when the person’s claim or defense and the main action [or proceeding] have a common question of law or fact” (CPLR 1013…). * * *

Although requests for leave to intervene invoke a court’s discretionary authority …, the thorough and well-reasoned submissions of the PLA and Sandy Knolls have shown that they have a “‘direct and substantial interest’ in the outcome of this litigation” and, therefore, Supreme Court erred in denying their motions to intervene … . Further, inasmuch as the motions to intervene were filed in the months after Supreme Court issued its order in proceeding No. 1, but before the final judgment was rendered in that proceeding more than a year and one half later, and approximately two years before judgment was entered in proceeding No. 2, we do not agree that denial of the motions on untimeliness grounds was necessitated … . Nor are there any indicia of undue prejudice to petitioners that would warrant the exclusion of the proposed intervenors from the matters . In light of this determination, the argument that the PLA and Sandy Knolls should have been joined as necessary parties has become academic.

Next, we consider Supreme Court’s finding …that collateral estoppel principles precluded respondents from challenging the [injunction]. As a “narrower species of res judicata,” the equitable doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes a party from retrying “an issue clearly raised in a prior action or proceeding and decided against that party or those in privity” … . In this regard, privity is an amorphous term not “susceptible to ease of application” …, and a court’s finding that differing parties are in privity requires consideration of “the character, right and extent of a party’s role in one proceeding as it bears on the intervention of the collateral estoppel doctrine in another” … . * * *[R]espondents were never given “a full and fair opportunity to contest the decision now said to be controlling” …, nor were their interests properly represented by [the defendant in the original injunction action], so as to warrant the application of collateral estoppel … . Borst v International Paper Co., 2014 NY Slip Op 07224, 3rd Dept 10-23-14

 

You might also like
Employer Did Not Exercise Sufficient Control over Claimant’s Work—Finding that Claimant Was an Employee Was Not Supported
Failure to Set Forth Manner and Timing of Restitution Required Remittance
COURT DID NOT MAKE SURE DEFENDANT WAS AWARE OF THE RIGHTS HE WAS GIVING UP BY PLEADING GUILTY, PLEA VACATED (THIRD DEPT).
PLAINTIFF, AGE 61, WAS HIRED FOR AS A CORRECTIONS OFFICER BUT RESIGNED AFTER TWO DAYS AT THE TRAINING ACADEMY; PLAINTIFF STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR AGE DISCRIMINATION AND A HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT; PLAINTIFF WAS NICKNAMED “GRANDMA” AND SUBJECTED TO RIDICULE (THIRD DEPT). ​
IF PLAINTIFF, A FOREMAN, HAD THE AUTHORITY TO STOP WORK BECAUSE OF RAIN, THEN HIS CONTINUING TO WORK MAY HAVE BEEN THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF HIS FALL; IF PLAINTIFF HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO WORK IN THE RAIN, THEN THE WET PLYWOOD MAY HAVE BEEN THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF HIS FALL; BECAUSE OF THE CONFLICTING OR ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE ON THESE ISSUES, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED; TWO JUSTICE DISSENT (THIRD DEPT).
LINK BETWEEN HEART ATTACK AND WORK NOT ESTABLISHED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
DESPITE THE DRIVER’S FAILURE TO USE A TURN SIGNAL AS THE JUSTIFICATION FOR THE TRAFFIC STOP, DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO A HEARING ON HIS MOTION TO VACATE HIS CONVICTION ON THE GROUND THE STOP WAS ACTUALLY BASED UPON RACIAL PROFILING; IN THE FIRST DEPARTMENT THE “TURN SIGNAL” GROUND FOR THE STOP WOULD BE ENOUGH, EVEN IF THE STOP WAS ACTUALLY MOTIVATED BY DISCRIMINATION; NOT SO IN THE THIRD DEPARTMENT (THIRD DEPT).
ALTHOUGH PETITIONER’S USING HIS CELL PHONE WHILE ON DUTY TO SEND EXPLICIT MESSAGES VIOLATED THE EMPLOYEE’S MANUAL AND WARRANTED PUNISHMENT, TERMINATION WAS TOO SEVERE A PENALTY (THIRD DEPT).

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2025 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

City Estopped from Denying Property Owner the Opportunity to Seek Discretionary... Nail and Mail Service Not Valid—Not Calculated to Give Timely Notice of...