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Attack on Plaintiff Upon Leaving Defendant-Lodge’s Premises Not Foreseeable—Landowner Had No Duty to Take Measures to Protect Against the Attack—Evidence Lodge Is Located in a “High Crime” Area Insufficient to Render Such an Attack Foreseeable

The Third Department determined the landowner did not have a duty to take measures to protect plaintiff who was assaulted and stabbed after leaving defendant’s fraternal lodge, even though there was evidence the lodge was located in a “high crime” area.  The evidence of prior crimes at the premises was not sufficient to render the attack on plaintiff foreseeable:

Landowners have a duty of reasonable care to maintain their property in a safe condition; although they “have a common-law duty to minimize foreseeable dangers on their property, including the criminal acts of third parties, they are not the insurers of a visitor’s safety” … . Notably, “even where there is an extensive history of criminal conduct on the premises, the landowner cannot be held to a duty to take protective measures unless it is shown that he or she either knows or has reason to know from past experience that there is a likelihood of conduct on the part of third persons which is likely to endanger the safety of the visitor” … . “The scope of the duty varies with the foreseeability of the potential harm” … . Stated another way, “no duty is imposed to protect . . . against unforeseeable and unexpected assaults” …, and “landowners have a duty to control third persons only when they have the opportunity to control such persons and are reasonably aware of the need for such control” … . Prior crimes need not be identical to a present crime in order to put a landowner on notice; “the inquiry of foreseeability depends upon the location, nature and extent of those previous criminal activities and their similarity, proximity or other relationship to the crime in question” … . Finally, although foreseeability is generally an issue to be resolved by the factfinder, it may be determined as a matter of law where the facts are undisputed and permit only one inference to be drawn therefrom … . Milton v IBPOE The World Forest city Lodge, #180, 2014 NY Slip Op 07242, 3rd Dept 10-23-14

 

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