You are here: / / Consent to Divorce In Exchange for Payments Would Violate Public Polic...
,

Consent to Divorce In Exchange for Payments Would Violate Public Policy

In the course of a lengthy decision dealing with several other issues, the Second Department explained why an in-court stipulation was properly vacated, noting that defendant-wife’s consent to the divorce in exchange for financial payments could not be consideration for the stipulated agreement because such an agreement would violate public policy:

To be enforceable, an open court stipulation must contain all of the material terms and evince a clear mutual accord between the parties (see CPLR 2104…). The 2011 on-the-record agreement was too incomplete and indefinite to be enforceable, and was merely a non-binding agreement to agree … . The parties disagreed whether the proposal included a waiver of maintenance and they did not finalize the details of the transfer of the 1999 Trust. Other material terms were never agreed upon, and the agreement was subject to the consummation of future conditions and additional agreements.

The agreement also lacked consideration … . Accepting defendant’s consent to the divorce in exchange for the financial payments would have been against public policy … . In any event, the parties unambiguously agreed that “whether we hammer out the agreement or not, the divorce will go forward uncontested.” There is no merit to defendant’s claim that her decision to avoid a public trial on fault grounds constituted consideration because it would have brought up embarrassing and difficult questions for plaintiff concerning his financial dealings. Cohen v Cohen, 2014 NY Slip Op 06157, 1st Dept 9-11-14

 

You might also like
NEW INFORMATION IN REPLY PAPERS PROPERLY CONSIDERED BY THE COURT.
PRE-ACTION DISCLOSURE OF THE IDENTITY OF THE PERSON OR PERSONS WHO DISTRIBUTED AN INTIMATE PHOTO OF A PORTION OF A HIGH SCHOOL STUDENT’S BODY PROPERLY GRANTED, THE FACTS SUPPORTED A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS.
THE JUDGE SHOULD HAVE HELD A HEARING BEFORE GRANTING THE BANK’S MOTION FOR AN ALTERNATIVE METHOD OF SERVICE IN THIS FORECLOSURE ACTION; DEFENDANT AVERRED THE ADDRESS LISTED ON THE MORTGAGE WAS CORRECT (SECOND DEPT).
SUCCESSIVE SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS WHICH ARE NOT BASED ON INFORMATION WHICH WAS NOT AVAILABLE AT THE TIME OF THE PRIOR MOTIONS SHOULD NOT BE ENTERTAINED BY THE COURT (SECOND DEPT).
Re: A Mental Hygiene Law Civil Commitment Proceeding for a Sex Offender, Failure to Give the Jury an Adequate Explanation of the Meaning of “Sex Offense” May Have Resulted in an Unsupported “Mental Abnormality” Finding
OFFICER DID NOT HAVE PROBABLE CAUSE TO SEARCH THE VAN AFTER HE LEARNED THAT DEFENDANT, WHO WAS SITTING IN THE PASSENGER SEAT, WAS SMOKING A CIGAR, NOT MARIJUANA, SUPREME COURT’S SUA SPONTE FINDING THAT DEFENDANT DID NOT HAVE STANDING TO CONTEST THE SEARCH WAS ERROR, THERE WAS UNCONTRADICTED EVIDENCE THE VAN WAS DEFENDANT’S WORK VEHICLE (SECOND DEPT).
Anders Brief Rejected
Violation of Confrontation Clause Was Harmless Error

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2025 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

Defendants Entitled to Summary Judgment in Slip and Fall Case Under the Storm... Wrong Party Name Could Not Be Remedied by Service of an Amended Summons and...