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City Can Not Be Held Liable for Injuries Caused by Attacking Dogs About Which Complaints Had Been Made—No Special Relationship Between Plaintiff’s Decedent and City

The Second Department determined no special relationship existed between plaiintiff’s decedent and the city such that the city could be held liable for the alleged failure to address complaints about the dogs which attacked plaintiff’s decedent, who died from the injuries.  The court explained why none of the criteria for a special relationship applied:

” A special relationship can be formed in three ways: (1) when the municipality violates a statutory duty enacted for the benefit of a particular class of persons; (2) when it voluntarily assumes a duty that generates justifiable reliance by the person who benefits from the duty; or (3) when the municipality assumes positive direction and control in the face of a known, blatant and dangerous safety violation'” … .

As for the first way of forming a special relationship, contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, a private right of action may not be fairly implied from Agriculture and Markets Law (hereinafter AML) § 123 … . The Supreme Court properly determined that the recognition of a private right of action would be inconsistent with the legislative scheme underlying AML § 123 … . Accordingly, no special relationship was created between the City and the decedent through the breach of a statutory duty.

As for the second way of forming a special relationship, the City met its prima facie burden of demonstrating its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by submitting evidence that it did not voluntarily assume a duty toward the decedent. To demonstrate that a municipality voluntarily assumed an affirmative duty and a plaintiff justifiably relied on the municipality’s undertaking, four elements must be shown: “(1) an assumption by a municipality, through promises or actions, of an affirmative duty to act on behalf of the injured party; (2) knowledge on the part of a municipality’s agents that inaction could lead to harm; (3) some form of direct contact between the municipality’s agents and the injured party; and (4) that party’s justifiable reliance on the municipality’s affirmative undertaking” … . Here, the City established and the plaintiff concedes that the decedent never made direct contact with the City, and the circumstances here did not give rise to one of the narrow exceptions to this requirement … . The absence of direct contact negates the existence of a special relationship pursuant to the City’s voluntary assumption of a duty to the decedent … .

As for the third way of forming a special relationship, which has been recognized in only rare circumstances, the City must affirmatively act to place the plaintiff in harm’s way … . Contrary to the plaintiff’s contention, the evidence established, prima facie, that the City did not take positive direction and control in the face of a known, blatant, and dangerous safety violation. Sutton v City of New York, 2014 NY Slip Op 05421, 2nd Dept 7-23-14

 

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