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Dissenter Would Have Reduced Defendant’s Sentence Because of His Age (15), the Factual Background of the Offense and Defendant’s “Sad Life”

The First Department affirmed the conviction and sentence of a defendant who was 15 years old at the time he pled guilty.  The court determined the sentencing court properly refused to grant the defendant youthful offender status.  The decision is notable for the extensive dissent of Justice Freedman who would have reduced the defendant’s sentence because of his age, the facts of the offense and the defendant’s background.  From the dissent:

I write separately because I believe the current law that allows 15 year olds to be tried as adult criminals, even though they are sentenced as juvenile offenders, belies everything science has taught us about the functioning of the juvenile brain (People v Rudolph, 21 NY3d 497 [Graffeo, J., concurring at 506] [2013]). For that reason, I would reduce the sentence to 2 to 6 years to be served concurrently with the five-year term of defendant’s Kings County sentence, but would not accord defendant the youthful offender treatment that he seeks. * * *

In the 2010 presentence report in the instant matter, the probation department stated that defendant “would benefit from a mental health evaluation and a residential mental health treatment program.” However, the court sentenced him to three to nine and denied youthful offender treatment. In pronouncing sentence here, the court noted that defendant had “a very sad life,” but since he “violated every condition” a sentence near the maximum without youthful offender treatment was warranted. The differences between juvenile and adult criminals were highlighted by the United State Supreme Court in Graham v Florida (560 US 48, 68 [2010] [“(a)s petitioner(s) point out, developments in psychology and brain science continue to show fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds. For example, parts of the brain involved in behavior control continue to mature through late adolescence” and “(a)s compared to adults, juveniles have a lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility. . . . Juveniles are more capable of change than are adults, and their actions are less likely to be evidence of irretrievably depraved character’ than are the actions of adults,” quoting Roper v Simmons, 543 US 551, 569, 570 (2005); see also People v Rudolph, 21 NY3d 506]).  People v Crawford, 2014 NY Slip Op 05364, 1st Dept 7-17-14

 

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