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Court Should Not Have Precluded Expert Evidence About the Quality of Representation Received by Indigent Defendants

The Third Department determined Supreme Court (acting as the trier of fact) should not have precluded the presentation of expert evidence in a case concerning the quality of legal services received by indigent criminal defendants:

Under familiar rules, expert opinions are admissible on subjects involving professional or scientific knowledge or skill not within the range of ordinary training or intelligence” of the trier of fact … . “[T]his principle applies to testimony regarding both ‘the ultimate questions and those of lesser significance'” … . Notably, expert testimony is “appropriate to clarify a wide range of issues calling for the application of accepted professional standards” … .

Here, the experts possess the requisite skill, training, education, knowledge and/or experience to qualify as experts on the operation of indigent defense systems and the evaluation of such systems in light of prevailing professional standards … . * * *

At its core, this litigation is about system-wide conditions relating to and affecting the delivery of public defense — such as caseloads, funding and oversight, among others — and whether these conditions in the defendant counties are such that “the basic constitutional mandate for the provision of counsel to indigent defendants at all critical stages is at risk of being left unmet” … . By virtue of their extensive experience, the experts possess specialized knowledge with respect to the operation of public defense systems, the professional standards applicable to such systems, and the impact of systemic shortcomings on the provision of counsel to indigent criminal defendants at all critical stages. Such particularized knowledge is, manifestly, beyond that of a typical Supreme Court Justice, whose experience is oft confined to case-by-case determinations … . Hurrell-Harring v State of New York 2014 NY Slip Op 05010, 3rd Dept 7-3-14

 

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