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Court Has Discretion to Order an Informal Psychological Assessment in Response to Defense Counsel’s Request for an Article 730 Assessment to Determine Whether Defendant Is Competent to Stand Trial

The Fourth Department noted that Supreme Court had the discretion to order an informal psychological assessment in response to defense counsel’s request for an examination pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law Article 730 to determine whether defendant was competent to stand trial:

…[D]efendant contends that Supreme Court erred in failing to follow the requirements of CPL article 730 to determine whether he was competent to stand trial at the time his case was presented to the grand jury (see CPL 730.30 [1]). We reject that contention. The record establishes that the court granted defense counsel’s request for a “forensic examination” of defendant by ordering only an informal psychological examination and not by issuing an order of examination pursuant to CPL article 730. We conclude that “[t]he decision of the court to order an informal psychological examination was within its discretion . . . and did not automatically require the court to issue an order of examination or otherwise comply with CPL article 730′ “… . People v Castro, 2014 NY Slip Op 05102, 4th Dept 7-3-14

 

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