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Nature of a Repugnant Verdict Explained—Here the Verdict Convicting Defendant of Criminal Possession of a Controlled Substance and Acquitting Defendant of Criminal Sale of a Controlled Substance Was Not Repugnant—The Proof at Trial Plays No Part in the Repugnancy Analysis

The Third Department determined County Court should not have determined a verdict was repugnant and sent the jury back for further deliberations.  The Third Department vacated the defendant's conviction on the relevant count.  In the course of the decision the Third Department explained the nature of a repugnant verdict, noting that the proof at trial plays no part in the analysis:

Contrary to defendant's assertion, the jury's initial verdict — convicting him of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree and acquitting him of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree — was not repugnant. “[A]; verdict as to a particular count shall be set aside [as repugnant]; only when it is inherently inconsistent when viewed in light of the elements of each crime as charged to the jury” … . In assessing a repugnancy claim, “we must review the elements of the offenses as charged to the jury without regard to the proof that was actually presented at trial. Thus, [i];f there is a possible theory under which a split verdict could be legally permissible, it cannot be repugnant, regardless of whether that theory has evidentiary support. . . . In this context, the apparently illogical nature of the verdict — as opposed to its impossibility — is viewed as a mistake, compromise or the exercise of mercy by the jury, none of which undermine[s]; a verdict as a matter of law” … .

Here, upon reviewing the elements of the subject offenses, it is readily apparent that the jury's verdict was not repugnant. Criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree requires proof that the defendant knowingly and unlawfully sold a narcotic drug (see Penal Law § 220.39 [1]), whereas criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree requires only, insofar as is relevant here, that the defendant knowingly and unlawfully possessed a narcotic drug with intent to sell it (see Penal Law § 220.16 [1]). Notably, a “[d];efendant's acquittal on the [sale count]; does not negate the elements of the [possession count], for a person can possess and intend to sell a narcotic drug, but not actually accomplish a sale” … . Defendant's argument to the contrary is predicated upon the specific proof adduced at trial, which — the Court of Appeals has instructed — is to play no role in our analysis of a repugnancy claim … . As the jury's initial verdict was not repugnant, County Court should have denied defendant's motion, accepted the jury's verdict and adjourned the matter for sentencing. Instead, County Court implicitly granted defendant's motion, devised a special verdict sheet and directed the jury to resume deliberations. People v Kramer, 2014 NY Slip Op 04085, 3rd Dept 6-5-14

 

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