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Supreme Court Should Have Proceeded to Second Step of Defendant’s “Batson” Challenge Alleging the Prosecutor’s Exclusion of Jurors on the Basis of Race

The Second Department determined Supreme Court should have proceeded to the second step of a “Batson” challenge alleging the prosecutor was excluding jurors on the basis of race.  The matter was sent back for a completion of the process:

As the United States Supreme Court stated in Batson v Kentucky (476 US 79), “[s];election procedures that purposefully exclude black persons from juries undermine public confidence in the fairness of our system of justice” (id. at 87). The first step under Batson requires a defendant to make a prima facie case “by showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose” … . This first step “is not to be onerous,” and is satisfied “by producing evidence sufficient to permit the trial judge to draw an inference that discrimination has occurred” … . When a prima facie showing is made, the burden shifts to the prosecution to provide a race-neutral explanation for the challenged peremptory exclusions … .

The defendant made a prima facie showing of discrimination based on the prosecutor’s exercise of peremptory challenges to exclude the only two prospective jurors who were black, the same race as the defendant. Contrary to the Supreme Court’s finding, under the circumstances of this case, those facts were sufficient to create an inference of purposeful discrimination in the prosecution’s use of peremptory challenges to strike the only two jurors in the venire who were black … .

Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have proceeded with the second step and, if applicable, the third step of the Batson inquiry. People v Chery, 2014 NY Slip Op 03697, 2nd Dept 5-21-14

 

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