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Defendants Who Struck Plaintiff’s Vehicle When Plaintiff Pulled Out of a Parking Lot Entitled to Summary Judgment

The Second Department determined summary judgment had been properly granted to the defendants (“Dunn defendants”).  The defendant driver had the right of way and struck plaintiff’s vehicle when plaintiff pulled out of a parking lot.  The court explained the operative principles:

There can be more than one proximate cause of an accident and, thus, on their motion for summary judgment, the Dunn defendants had the burden of establishing freedom from comparative negligence … . While a driver is required to “see that which through proper use of [his or her] senses [he or she] should have seen” …, a driver who has the right-of-way is entitled to anticipate that other drivers will obey the traffic laws requiring them to yield to the driver with the right-of-way… .. In addition, “a driver with the right-of-way who has only seconds to react to a vehicle which has failed to yield is not comparatively negligent for failing to avoid the collision” … .

Here, the Dunn defendants established their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law by establishing that the injured plaintiff failed to yield the right-of-way to the Dunn vehicle, which was legally proceeding westbound on Montauk Highway with the right-of-way, and that Danielle Costella Dunn was free from comparative negligence since she had only had seconds to react … . Kenda v Dunn 2014 NY Slip Op 03494, 2nd Dept 5-14-14

 

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