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Requirements for Notice of Intent Met Despite Flaws in Document

The Fourth Department determined a flawed document which followed the format of a Notice of Claim under the General Municipal Law met the requirements for a Notice of Intent under the Court of Claims Act:

Here, we conclude that the document is a proper notice of intent. We agree with defendant that the document “had all the hallmarks of a notice of claim against a municipality,” rather than a notice of intent against the State, including the title of the document, the stated venue as “Supreme Court,” the references to the General Municipal Law, and the naming of the County of Orleans as a “respondent.” Nevertheless, the document names the State as a “respondent” and alleges that the premises where claimant fell were owned by the State, and claimant served the document on the Attorney General. In addition, we conclude that the mistake in naming the place where the claim arose as the “Orleans County Correctional Facility” (emphasis added) does not require dismissal of the claim. Claimant provided the proper address where the claim arose, which showed that her fall occurred at the Orleans Correctional Facility, and not at the Orleans County Jail, which is located on a different street.With regard to the requisite specificity as to the place where the claim arose, we note that ” [w]hat is required is not absolute exactness, but simply a statement made with sufficient definiteness to enable [defendant] to be able to investigate the claim promptly and to ascertain its liability under the circumstances’ ” …. .  Mosley v State of New York, 2014 NY Slip Op 03054, 4th Dept 5-2-14

 

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