You are here: / / Defense Counsel, Not Defendant, Has the Ultimate Authority to Determine...
,

Defense Counsel, Not Defendant, Has the Ultimate Authority to Determine Whether Defendant Should Testify Before the Grand Jury

The First Department (after noting that the record supported closing the courtroom for the undercover officer’s testimony, even though the trial court did not discuss alternatives) determined the trial court properly found defense counsel had the ultimate authority to decide whether defendant should testify before the grand jury and therefore properly denied defendant’s request to testify against the advice of his attorney:

Criminal Court … properly determined that defense counsel had the ultimate authority to decide whether his client should testify before the grand jury, and properly denied defendant’s request to testify against the advice of his attorney. Defendant’s argument “incorrectly equates the right to testify before the grand jury with the right to testify at trial” … . “[U]nlike certain fundamental decisions as to whether to testify at trial, which are reserved to the defendant . . . with respect to strategic and tactical decisions like testifying before the grand jury, defendants represented by counsel are deemed to repose decision-making authority in their lawyers” … . The strategic decision to testify before the grand jury requires the “expert judgment of counsel” …, because it involves weighing the possibility of a dismissal, which, in counsel’s judgment, may be remote, against the potential disadvantages of providing the prosecution with discovery and impeachment material, making damaging admissions, and prematurely narrowing the scope of possible defenses. People v Brown, 2014 NY Slip Op 02683, 1st Dept 4-17-14

 

You might also like
THE ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE REQUIRED SERVICE BY OVERNIGHT EXPRESS; THE ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WAS SERVED BY PRIORITY MAIL; THE FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE SPECIFIED MANNER OF SERVICE DEPRIVED THE COURT OF JURISDICTION TO HEAR THE MOTION.
DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR MAY APPLY TO WINDOW FALLING ONTO PLAINTIFF, DEFENDANT BUILDING MANAGER’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT).
UNSIGNED FORM INSUFFICIENT TO MAKE RESPONDENT THE BENEFICIARY OF DECEDENT’S IRA (FIRST DEPT).
FAILURE TO INFORM THE DEFENSE ABOUT A SECOND EYEWITNESS TO THE SHOOTING WAS A REVERSIBLE BRADY VIOLATION, THE MOTION TO VACATE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED; NEW TRIAL ORDERED (FIRST DEPT).
Allowing the Prosecutor to Tell the Jury in Summation that the Person Who Provided the Police with a Tip Must Have Identified the Defendant as the Perpetrator Was Reversible Error—The Prosecutor Effectively Told the Jury Another “Witness” Had Identified the Defendant, But that “Witness” Did Not Testify and Could Not, Therefore, Be Cross-Examined
PLAINTIFF ALLEGED DEFENDANT’S EMPLOYEE, A SECURITY GUARD, ATTACKED HER; DEFENDANT’S EMPLOYEE ALLEGED PLAINTIFF ATTACKED HIM AND HE ACTED IN SELF DEFENSE; THE EMPLOYER WOULD NOT BE LIABLE UNDER EITHER SCENARIO; THE EMPLOYER’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED (FIRST DEPT).
HOMEOWNER EXEMPTION APPLIED TO THE CHURCH IN THIS LABOR LAW 240 (1), 241 (6) AND 200 ACTION STEMMING FROM A FALL FROM A SCAFFOLD, FAILURE TO PLEAD THE EXEMPTION AS A DEFENSE DID NOT PRECLUDE RAISING IT IN A SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION, ARCHDIOCESE WAS NOT AN AGENT OF THE OWNER, NO LABOR LAW 200 LIABILITY BECAUSE PLAINTIFF’S EMPLOYER SUPERVISED AND CONTROLLED THE MEANS AND MANNER OF WORK (FIRST DEPT).
PROOF THE ELEVATOR DOOR MALFUNCTIONED WHEN PLAINTIFF ATTEMPTED TO ENTER THE ELEVATOR DID NOT SUPPORT A PRODUCTS LIABILITY CAUSE OF ACTION (FIRST DEPT). ​

Categories

Sign Up for the Mailing List to Be Notified When the Site Is Updated.

  • This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged.

Copyright © 2026 New York Appellate Digest, Inc.
Site by CurlyHost | Privacy Policy

Temporary Restraining Order Prohibiting Broadcast About a Murder of Which Plaintiff... Complaint Stated Causes of Action for a Constructive Trust and Quantum Meru...