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Obstruction of View of Stop Sign by Vegetation Not Actionable Against the Town Without Allegation Town Had Prior Written Notice of the Obstruction

The Second Department determined Supreme Court should have dismissed the cause of action against the Town of Oyster Bay which alleged vegetation had been allowed to obstruct a stop sign (leading to a collision).  The prior written notice requirement applied and the plaintiffs did not allege the Town had prior written notice of the obstruction:

The Town correctly argues that any claim that vegetation obstructed a driver’s view of the intersection and of traffic on the intersecting roadways is subject to its prior written notice statute … . Since the plaintiffs did not allege that the Town had received prior written notice of any obstructed sight lines in and around the subject intersection, the Supreme Court should have granted that branch of the Town’s motion which was to dismiss that claim … . Dutka v Odierno, 2014 NY Slip Op 02558, 2nd Dept 4-16-14

 

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