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Application for “Special Immigrant Juvenile” Status Need Only Assert Reunification with One Parent Is Not Possible

The Second Department reiterated  that an application for “special immigrant juvenile” status need only be supported by the allegation that reunification with one parent is not possible:

Pursuant to 8 USC § 1101(a)(27)(J) (as amended by the William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, Pub L 110—457, 122 US Stat 5044) and 8 CFR 204.11, a “special immigrant juvenile” is a resident alien who is, inter alia, under 21 years of age, unmarried, and “declared dependent on a juvenile court located in the United States or whom such [*2]a court has legally committed to, or placed under the custody of, an agency or department of a State, or an individual or entity appointed by a State or juvenile court located in the United States” (8 USC § 1101[a][27][J][i]). For a juvenile to qualify for SIJS status, it must also be determined that reunification with “1 or both” of the juvenile’s parents is not viable due to parental abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis found under state law (id.), and that it would not be in the juvenile’s best interest to be returned to his or her native country or country of last habitual residence (see 8 USC § 1101[a][27][J][ii]). As previously determined by this Court, the “1 or both” language requires only a finding that reunification is not viable with one parent … .  Matter of Gabriel HM…, 2014 NY Slip Op 02587, 2nd Dept 4-16-14

 

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