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Commissioner of Education Has Primary Jurisdiction Over Dispute About the Appropriate Pay for a School Principal Whose Position Was Abolished But Who Was Subsequently Assigned an Assistant Principal Position/Petition for Stay of Arbitration Pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement Should Have Been Granted/Arbitration Prohibited by Public Policy

The Fourth Department determined Supreme Court should have granted petitioner’s application for a stay of arbitration.  A former principal whose position was abolished was hired as an assistant principal.  A grievance was filed by respondent on the former principal’s behalf contending that her new position warranted the same level of pay she had received in the abolished position. After the grievance was denied by petitioner, the respondent demanded arbitration pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement.  The Fourth Department determined the demand for arbitration should have been denied because the matter must be determined by the Commission of Education in the first instance:

It is well settled that, in deciding an application to stay or compel arbitration under CPLR 7503, the court is concerned only with the threshold determination of arbitrability, and not with the merits of the underlying claim (see CPLR 7501…). In making the threshold determination of arbitrability, the court applies a two-part test. It first determines whether “there is any statutory, constitutional or public policy prohibition against arbitration of the grievance” … . “If no prohibition exists,[the court then determines] whether the parties in fact agreed to arbitrate the particular dispute by examining their collective bargaining agreement” … .

Here, we agree with petitioner that the Commissioner of Education has primary jurisdiction over the parties’ dispute, and that arbitration is therefore prohibited by public policy. As we have previously noted, “ ‘the Commissioner of Education has the specialized knowledge and expertise to resolve the factual issue of whether the . . . former position and the new position are similar within the meaning of Education Law § [2510 (3) (a)]’ ” … . Based on his or her specialized knowledge and expertise, the Commissioner of Education should “resolve, in the first instance,” the issue of fact whether two positions are sufficiently similar under Education Law § 2510 … . Matter of Arbitration …, 285, 4th Dept 3-28-14

 

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