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Plaintiff’s Alleging a Deed Executed Within the Ten-Year Statute of Limitations for Adverse Possession Is Void Creates a Presumption of Possession by the Plaintiff Within the Ten-Year Period

The Second Department determined that plaintiff’s action to quiet title was not time-barred. Plaintiff alleged decedent’s signature on a deed was forged. By alleging the 1998 deed was void, plaintiff is presumed to have had possession of the premises within the statutory 10-year statute of limitations for adverse possession:

CPLR 212(a) provides that “[a]n action to recover real property or its possession cannot be commenced unless the plaintiff, or his predecessor in interest, was seized or possessed of the premises within ten years before the commencement of the action” (CPLR 212[a]…). However, CPLR 212(a) must be read together with RPAPL 311, which provides that “the person who establishes a legal title to the premises is presumed to have been possessed thereof within the time required by law; and the occupation of the premises by another person is deemed to have been under and in subordination to the legal title unless the premises have been held and possessed adversely to the legal title for ten years before the commencement of the action” (RPAPL 311 [emphasis added]…)..Here, the plaintiff sufficiently alleged possession of the subject premises within 10 years of commencing this action by asserting that the 1998 deed …, as well as each subsequent deed in the chain of title, was void. Under these circumstances, “the plaintiff, as the alleged legal title holder of the premises, is presumed to have possession of the premises within the time required” … . Elam v Altered Ego Realty Holding Corp, 2014 NY Slip Op 01292, 2nd Dept 2-26-14

 

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