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Society Supporting Protection of Preservation Area Had Standing to Challenge Waiver Allowing Business to Operate in Area

The Second Department determined that the petitioners had standing to challenge the planning commission’s determination that the respondents should be granted a hardship waiver (Environmental Conservation Law 57-0121(10)) to continue a commercial landscaping and horticultural services business in a preservation area (Long Island Central Pine Barrens).  Richard Amper, in his capacity as Executive Director of the Long Island Barrens Society, Inc, opposed the granting of the waiver and brought the underlying Arcticle 78 proceeding.  The Second Department determined the respondent had met the requirements for a hardship waiver.  On the question of standing, the Second Department wrote:

…[T]he Supreme Court erred in holding that the petitioners lacked standing to challenge the determination. Whether an organization or association has standing involves the application of the three-pronged test set forth in Society of Plastics Indus. v County of Suffolk (77 NY2d 761). As pertinent to this appeal, the first prong of that test requires that the organization or association demonstrate that “one or more of its members would have standing to sue” as an individual (id. at 775). An individual has standing where he or she “would suffer direct harm, injury that is in some way different from that of the public at large” (id. at 774) and “the in-fact injury of which [he or she] complains . . . falls within the zone of interests,’ or concerns, sought to be promoted or protected by the statutory provision under which the agency has acted” (id. at 773 …). In Matter of Save the Pine Bush, Inc. v Common Council of City of Albany (13 NY3d 297), the Court of Appeals held that, in land-use and environmental cases, “a person who can prove that he or she uses and enjoys a natural resource more than most other members of the public has standing . . . to challenge government actions that threaten that resource” (id. at 301). Here, the petitioners established that Amper, in both his individual and professional capacities, uses and enjoys the Pine Barrens to a greater degree than most other members of the public. The fact that Amper lives some distance from the property in question is not dispositive (see id. at 305…). Further, the petitioners established that the threatened injury to Amper caused by development within the core preservation area of the Central Pine Barrens falls within the zone of interests sought to be protected by the Long Island Pine Barrens Protection Act of 1993 (L 1993, ch 262) (hereinafter the Act) … . Thus, Amper has standing to sue individually, and his standing satisfied the first prong of the test for the Society’s organizational standing. The Society meets the second and third prongs of the organizational standing test, namely that its interests in the instant proceeding are germane to its purposes, and that “neither the asserted claim nor the appropriate relief requires the participation of the individual members.” Therefore, the Society also has standing to challenge the Commission’s determination (id. at 775). Matter of Long Is Pine Barrnes Socy, Inc v Central Pine Barrens Joint Planning & Policy Commn, 2014 NY Slip Op 00511, 2nd Dept 1-29-14

 

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