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Rear-End Collision: No Rational Process By Which Jury Could Have Found Plaintiff Negligent

The Second Department determined there was no rational process by which the jury could have found the plaintiff negligent in a rear-end collision case.  Plaintiff’s CPLR 4401 motion for judgment as a matter of law should have been granted. The plaintiff was stopped to allow a pedestrian, who had run in front of the vehicle, to cross.  The defendant acknowledged that he took his eyes off the road briefly to look at the pedestrians and then struck the rear of plaintiff’s car:

” A rear-end collision with a stopped or stopping vehicle creates a prima facie case of negligence with respect to the operator of the moving vehicle and imposes a duty on that operator to rebut the inference of negligence by providing a nonnegligent explanation for the collision'” … . Moreover, although the issue of comparative fault generally presents a question of fact …, that issue should be submitted to a jury “only where there is a triable issue of fact as to whether the frontmost driver also operated his or her vehicle in a negligent manner” … .

Here, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant, there is no rational process by which the jury could find that the defendant had a nonnegligent explanation for the accident, or that the plaintiff was, to any extent, at fault in the happening of the accident. Clarke v Phillps, 2013 NY Slip Op 08585, 2nd Dept 12-26-13

 

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