“Evidentiary Fact” Resolved In Favor of Defendant by a Jury In the First Trial May Not Be Contradicted by Evidence Presented in the Second Trial

In a full-fledged opinion by Judge Smith, over a dissent, the Court of Appeals determined the doctrine of collateral estoppel prohibited the introduction of evidence a firearm was displayed in the course of a robbery.  In the first trial, the defendant was acquitted of First Degree Robbery (which requires display of a firearm) and convicted of Second Degree Robbery (display of a weapon is not an element of Second Degree Robbery). The conviction was reversed on appeal.  In the second trial (for Second Degree Robbery only), the People presented evidence a weapon was displayed.  The court found the People were collaterally estopped from presenting evidence of the display of a weapon in the second trial:

This case is controlled by our holding in People v Acevedo (69 NY2d 478, 480 [1987]) that “the doctrine of collateral estoppel can be applied to issues of ‘evidentiary’ fact.”  As we explained in Acevedo, in the analysis of collateral estoppel issues, facts essential to the second judgment are considered “ultimate” facts; other facts are only “evidentiary” (id. at 480 n 1).  Under Acevedo, when an issue of evidentiary fact has been resolved in a defendant’s favor by a jury, the People may not, at a later trial, present evidence that contradicts the first jury’s finding.  People v O’Toole, 233, CtApp 12-10-13