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Presumption in Favor of Resentencing (re: the New Scheme for Drug Offenses) Not Rebutted—Supreme Court Should Not Have Denied Motion for Resentencing

The Second Department determined the factors relied upon by the resentencing court were not sufficient to overcome the presumption in favor of resentencing under Criminal Procedure Law 440.46:

The Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion to be resentenced pursuant to CPL 440.46. Although resentencing is not mandatory, there is a statutory presumption in favor of resentencing (see L 2004, ch 738, § 23; CPL 440.46[3]…). Under the circumstances of this case, the factors relied upon by the Supreme Court in denying the motion–the defendant’s criminal history, disciplinary infractions, and parole violations–are insufficient to overcome the statutory presumption. The defendant served more than 14 years in prison for a low-level drug crime committed when he was 19 years old. The defendant’s criminal history included only larcenous and low-level drug crimes, all committed before he was 20 years old. While the defendant violated his parole by failing to abide by certain parole rules, including, inter alia, by breaking curfew and by traveling to Georgia to be reunited with his family, he has never committed another crime or had a positive drug test. Under all of the circumstances presented here, “the presumption that the defendant is entitled to benefit from the reforms enacted by the Legislature based upon its judgment that the prior sentencing scheme for drug offenses like that committed by the defendant was excessively harsh, has not been rebutted”… . People v Simmons, 2013 NY Slip Op 08103, 2nd Dept 12-4-13

 

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