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The Prosecutor’s Summation Was Filled With Impermissible Statements and Suggestions, Requiring Reversal of Defendant’s Conviction

The Third Department reversed defendant’s conviction because of the prosecutor’s impermissible statements in summation. The prosecutor vouched for his witnesses, suggested that in order to believe the defendant the jury would have to believe there was a conspiracy to convict him, involving the trial judge, and effectively shifted the burden of proof to the defendant:

During the course of his summation, the prosecutor, among other things, repeatedly vouched for the credibility of the People’s witnesses (“He’s telling the truth”).  Such comments clearly are impermissible … .  We reach a similar conclusion regarding the prosecutor’s statement that if the jury was inclined to believe defendant, he had “a bridge in Brooklyn [to] sell” as well … .  These errors were compounded by the prosecutor’s completely speculative comment that “the only reason that [defendant] wasn’t involved in the other robbery that [Young] and [Ervin] committed” not long after the attack upon the victim “was because he couldn’t be there with them” – suggesting that had defendant not been in custody at the time that the subsequent robbery was committed, he would have participated in that crime as well.  Although the prosecutor’s comment in this regard undeniably was improper …, it paled in comparison to his statement that, in order to believe defendant’s version of events, the jury had to accept that there was a far-reaching conspiracy to convict defendant — one that included the trial judge.  Specifically, the prosecutor stated, “[H]ere’s what you’ll have to find to find that the defendant is not guilty.  This is what you have to believe.  You have to believe there was a conspiracy against [defendant,] that every single one of the witnesses that came in here went over there, put their hand on the Bible, swore to tell the truth, and then lied and made up a story, and that the detectives from the Albany Police Department . . . got together and risked their entire careers and got together with . . . Ervin and . . . Young to frame [defendant].  Then they got me involved to continue prosecuting the case, and then they got Judge Herrick and Judge Breslin to go along with these cooperation agreements and allowed them to come in here and lie.”

The problem with the foregoing statement is three-fold. First, the comment made by the prosecutor relative to what the jury would need to believe in order to find that defendant was not guilty arguably shifted the burden of proof from the People to defendant.  Additionally, the prosecutor’s reference to a conspiracy in no way constitutes fair comment upon the evidence adduced.  Although defendant indeed testified that Young and Ervin were not being truthful, he never suggested that the People’s witnesses, among others, were engaged in a conspiracy to wrongfully convict him, and there is nothing in the record to support such a claim.  Finally, there is no question that one of the jury’s key roles in a criminal trial is to assess the credibility of the witnesses who testify on behalf of the People and, in those instances where the defendant takes the stand or otherwise presents witnesses in support of his or her defense, to weigh the credibility of the People’s witnesses vis-a-vis the defendant’s witnesses.  Such a “credibility contest” is entirely permissible, and there is nothing inherently prejudicial about that evaluative process.  Here, however, the prosecutor’s commentary set up a far different credibility contest by suggesting to the jury that it could believe defendant only if it also believed that the trial judge, among others, had permitted the People’s witnesses to lie to the jury and/or otherwise engaged in some form of misconduct.  Simply put, the prosecutor’s conduct in pitting defendant against the very judge who had presided over the course of the trial was inexcusable and, despite defense counsel’s prompt objection and County Court’s appropriate curative instruction, the prejudicial impact of that conduct cannot be ignored. People v Forbes, 104771, 3rd Dept 11-27-13

PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT

 

 

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